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ALEXANDER P. FRAWLEY† 
Most sports fans consistently rely on the secondary ticket market. After all, the 
secondary ticket market provides fans with numerous benefits, including the opportunity 
to obtain tickets to sold out, high-profile events and the ability to resell tickets to recoup 
the cost of a ticket for an event they cannot attend. But some key players—namely, 
primary ticket sellers like sports teams—have lamented the rise of the secondary market, 
complaining that resale exchanges unfairly profit from the teams’ labor and diminish the 
value of buying tickets directly from the teams. Consequently, teams have begun to develop 
new initiatives to curb the growth of the secondary market, including establishing official 
team resale exchanges to compete with sites like StubHub, prohibiting season ticket 
holders from selling tickets on unofficial resale exchanges, and implementing ticket 
delivery procedures that make it more difficult to resell tickets. Fortunately for teams, 
the law cuts squarely in their favor as courts, academics, and industry professionals 
alike adhere to the late nineteenth century notion of tickets as fully revocable licenses. 
As such, teams are free to impose resale restrictions as they see fit. 
But in this Comment, I argue that lawmakers should reconsider the extent to which 
teams can continue to use the revocable license rule to restrict ticket holders’ resale rights. 
I show how the revocable license rule, though widely accepted today, was criticized and 
often rejected by early twentieth century courts and academics for seemingly allowing 
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proprietors to unfairly and arbitrarily exclude innocent ticket-holding patrons. I then 
explain how business incentives nevertheless prevented proprietors from abusing the rule 
and how judges and lawmakers relied on the assumption that these incentives would 
prevent the rule from being abused. In doing so, I show that the rule was actually 
adopted for a very limited purpose—namely, to protect a proprietor’s right to exclude 
unruly patrons. Given that limited purpose, I argue that courts and scholars have 
gradually—but improperly—extended the rule of tickets as revocable licenses such that 
primary ticket vendors now wield a type of unilateral power over ticket holders that the 
original proponents of the rule never intended to establish. Therefore, I urge that 
lawmakers stop allowing the notion of tickets as revocable licenses to inform the 
industry’s discourse about ticket holders’ rights. Finally, I explore various practical 
legislative solutions to reform the secondary market, which are free from the rigid 
assumptions of the revocable license rule and which account for the legitimate concerns of 
both ticket holders and teams. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sports in America make up a multibillion dollar industry, and teams generate 
money from various sources, including ticket sales, concessions, television 
contracts, licensing, and merchandise.1 Major League Baseball (MLB), for 
example, earned $9.5 billion in revenue during the 2015 baseball season, which 
marked the thirteenth consecutive year that MLB saw an increase in total 
revenue.2 The New York Yankees, one of MLB’s most high-profile franchises, 
earned $516 million during the 2016 baseball season, of which $259 million—over 
50%—came from ticket sales.3 As revenue has grown, fans have literally paid the 
price. On average, a family of four spent $337.20 to attend a 2016 New York 
Yankees baseball game.4 While Yankees tickets are the second-highest priced 
tickets in MLB, the average cost of attending an MLB game for a family of 
four still reaches an astonishing $219.53.5 
These prices naturally lead to two questions for sports fans. First, what 
happens when a ticket holder can no longer attend a game: is there a way for 
him to recoup the cost of the tickets? Second, and relatedly, are there any ways 
for fans on tighter budgets to purchase tickets at discounted prices? Fortunately, 
fans in both situations can turn to the secondary ticket market.6 One of the 
 
1 Danette R. Davis, Comment, The Myth & Mystery of Personal Seat Licenses and Season Tickets: 
Licenses or More?, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 241, 241 (2006). 
2 Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record Revenues for 2015, Up $500 Million and Approaching $9.5 Billion, 
FORBES (Dec. 4, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2015/12/04/mlb-sees-record-
revenues-for-2015-up-500-million-and-approaching-9-5-billion/print [https://perma.cc/UE9E-KBK6]. 
3 New York Yankees, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/teams/new-york-yankees [https://perma.cc/
G4CU-WHP5]. 
4 See TEAM MKTG. REPORT, MLB 1 (2016), https://www.teammarketing.com/public/uploaded
PDFs/MLB-FCI-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ9Y-BZ8M] (providing the “Fan Cost Index” (FCI) 
of attending a New York Yankees game, which includes the cost of four “adult average-price tickets,” 
two “small draft beers,” four “small soft drinks,” four “regular-size hot dogs,” “parking for one . . . car,” 
and two “least expensive, adult-size adjustable caps”). 
5 See id. 
6 See Susan Johnston Taylor, 9 Ways to Save on Sports Tickets, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 
22, 2013, 12:10 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2013/08/22/9-ways-to-
save-on-sports-tickets [https://perma.cc/8SM6-7FCB] (noting that ticket holders who cannot attend 
games “often resell their tickets on [secondary resale] websites like StubHub.com, TicketCity.com, or 
eBay”). Fans can find tickets for prices below face value on the secondary market because ticket holders 
who can no longer attend games “simply want[] to get rid of” their tickets. Id. “Face value” refers to the 
price that is printed on the ticket and charged by a primary ticket vendor, such as a sports team. 
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more popular secondary market exchanges, StubHub.com, provides an online 
marketplace that connects fans seeking to sell tickets with fans seeking to 
purchase tickets to various kinds of entertainment events, including sports 
games, concerts, and theater performances.7 
At first glance, the proliferation of secondary-ticket-market websites like 
StubHub seems financially beneficial for ticket holders trying to sell tickets, 
fans seeking to purchase tickets, and primary ticket sellers such as teams and 
sports leagues.8 Ticket holders can recoup some of their money for games 
they cannot attend, and some may even earn a profit when selling tickets to a 
particularly popular event.9 Likewise, fans searching for tickets sometimes 
save money on the face value price by using the secondary market instead of 
buying directly from the team.10 Moreover, fans that are unable to secure 
tickets during a venue’s original public sale can use the secondary market to 
buy tickets for sold out events without having to worry about the risk of 
buying a fake ticket from a ticket scalper outside of the stadium.11 Finally, 
many sports teams and leagues have formed mutually beneficial agreements 
with StubHub, which require those teams to direct ticket holders and ticket 
 
7 About Us, STUBHUB, http://www.stubhub.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/C2GT-SEJR]. 
StubHub generates revenue by charging fees to both the buyer and seller. James Geddes, How to Sell 
Concert or Event Tickets on StubHub, TECH TIMES (May 28, 2015, 8:55 AM), http://www.techtimes. 
com/articles/55930/20150528/how-to-sell-concert-or-event-tickets-on-stubhub.htm [https://perma.cc/9Z9P-
HHND]. For the seller fee, StubHub collects 15% of the sale price. Brett Goldberg, StubHub Fees | The 
Truth About Buyer and Seller Fees, TICKPICKBLOG (Aug. 26, 2015), https://blog.tickpick.com/stubhub-
buyer-seller-fees [https://perma.cc/2WR8-6HDS]. In addition, StubHub charges the buyer a fee that is 
between 2% and 20% of the sale price. Id. For example, on a $100 sale, the buyer could pay up to $120. In 
that case, the seller would collect $85, and StubHub would retain the remaining $35. 
8 In this Comment, the “primary” ticket market refers to ticket sales by teams directly to fans who, 
upon purchase, become ticket holders. The “secondary” ticket market refers to transactions between ticket 
holders and fans seeking to purchase tickets. 
9 As an example, tickets for one very high-demand game between the New York Yankees and 
their rival, the Boston Red Sox, sold on StubHub for over 300% of the face value price. Bill King & 
Eric Fisher, Second Thoughts, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS J. (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www. sports
businessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011/10/24/In-Depth/Main.aspx [https://perma.cc/NA63-4L4D]. 
10 See Matthew Feuerman, Note, Court-Side Seats? The Communications Decency Act and the Potential 
Threat to StubHub and Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces, 57 B.C. L. REV. 227, 229 (2016) (“[W]hen the supply of 
tickets greatly exceeds the demand, StubHub is home to ticket prices that are far below face value.”). 
11 For many high-profile, sold out events, such as the Super Bowl, demand for tickets “greatly 
exceeds supply.” Id. at 228. Tickets to the 2016 Super Bowl were sold on StubHub for an average 
price of $4879, even though the face value prices ranged from $500 to $1800 for general admission 
and up to $3000 for premium seating. Brent Schrotenboer, Getting into Super Bowl 50 a Tricky Ticket, 
USA TODAY (Feb. 7, 2016, 1:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2016/02/04/super-
bowl-50-tickets-secondary-market-stubhub/79820832 [https://perma.cc/736K-N8EV]. Secondary ticket 
market websites allow fans to purchase tickets for these kinds of events without having to worry about 
the risk of being duped into purchasing fake tickets. See, e.g., The StubHub FanProtect Guarantee, STUBHUB, 
http://www.stubhub.com/legal/?section=fp [https://perma.cc/PXA9-4LXY] (guaranteeing comparable 
tickets or a full refund to purchasers when tickets are fraudulent, not delivered in time, or deviate from 
those listed by the seller). 
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seekers to StubHub in exchange for a percentage of the transaction fees that 
StubHub charges to fans. For example, “StubHub is the [o]fficial [f]an to [f]an 
[t]icket [m]arketplace of MLB.com.”12 Under its agreement with MLB, StubHub 
sends more than half of its commission fees for MLB tickets to MLB, which 
then distributes some of that money to all thirty MLB teams.13 In 2011, 
StubHub sent roughly $60 million to MLB as part of the agreement.14 Thus, 
secondary ticket venues like StubHub seem beneficial for ticket holders, ticket 
seekers, and teams. 
Nevertheless, some key players do not view the secondary market 
favorably—namely, many primary ticket vendors, such as sports teams. Derek 
Schiller, an Atlanta Braves marketing executive, has referred to the proliferation 
of secondary market ticket sales as the “bigge[st] threat to the professional 
team sports marketplace and industry as a whole.”15 In 2011, eight million 
MLB tickets were sold on StubHub.16 This figure amounts to an average of 
roughly 3000 tickets per MLB game or ten percent of the average per game 
attendance.17 These numbers trouble team executives, who believe that the 
secondary market has transformed from its original purpose—“a place where 
fans could pay a premium for great seats at hard-to-crack events”—to “a flea 
market where buyers have their pick from thousands of seats to many games, 
often at prices that compete with, or even beat, the prices offered by the 
teams.”18 For example, Robert Alvarado, Vice President of Marketing and 
Ticket Sales for the Los Angeles Angels, laments StubHub’s rise from a 
“small player” to a legitimate threat that is “killing us.”19 In other words, 
teams believe that secondary ticket exchanges like StubHub harm teams by 
drawing away fans who traditionally bought tickets for non–sold out games 
directly from teams.20 The idea is that for every ticket bought on StubHub, 
there is one less ticket sale for a team. 
 
12 StubHub Seller FAQ, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/ticketing/stubhub_faq_seller.jsp?c_id=
mlb [https://perma.cc/PQ3R-VD7K]. 
13 King & Fisher, supra note 9. 
14 Id. MLB and StubHub agreed to a five-year renewal of their partnership in late 2012, assuring that 
StubHub would continue to serve as the league’s official reseller through the 2017 baseball season. MLB 
Renews Deal with StubHub, ESPN (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/8732189/major-
league-baseball-stubhub-renew-secondary-ticket-market-deal [https://perma.cc/25YL-CQMT]. 




19 Id. Of course, not every team is critical of the secondary ticket market. See, e.g., id. (noting that 
Derrick Hall, President and CEO of the Arizona Diamondbacks, embraces StubHub because it helps 
the team reach their attendance goals). 
20 See, e.g., Josh Kosman, Yanks Rip StubHub for Not Great-Gate, N.Y. POST (June 5, 2012), 
http://nypost.com/2012/06/05/yanks-rip-stubhub-for-not-great-gate/#ixzz1x1tL5gth [https://perma.cc/
3LL5-YY8J] (“Yankee Stadium attendance is down 3.6 percent so far this year . . . and the team is blaming 
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Primary ticket sellers have responded accordingly, developing new initiatives 
that both curb the growth of the secondary market and capture a greater 
share of the profits that inevitably flow from secondary ticket sales. Some 
teams have established their own official secondary ticket exchanges and now 
prohibit season ticket holders from using unofficial exchanges.21 Others have 
implemented new ticket delivery mechanisms aimed at limiting opportunities 
for resale.22 These attempts to restrict ticket holders’ resale opportunities 
have generated significant attention in the sports industry.23 The issue is 
arguably the “most high-profile [topic that] the ticketing world has seen” 
because it involves the critical questions of “whether the fan or the team 
owns the right to the ticket and whether teams can legally restrict fans to 
venues for reselling their seats.”24 
This question naturally raises another: what rights, if any, inhere in the 
possession of a ticket? A survey of contemporary scholarship and case law 
suggests a clear answer: not many. “[C]ourts have uniformly recognized that 
tickets are revocable licenses,” subject to the will of the grantor, and that resale 
 
StubHub for its gate woes.”); see also Barry Petchesky, The Market for Yankees Tickets Is Worse than We Thought, 
DEADSPIN (June 7, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://deadspin.com/5916635/the-market-for-yankees-tickets-is-worse-
than-we-thought [https://perma.cc/7HVN-XWRX] (referencing data showing that in 2012, 66.39% of 
Yankees tickets sold on the secondary market were sold for lower than face value prices and that tickets were, 
on average, sold at a 17% discount from the face value price). MLB’s 2012 five-year renewal agreement with 
StubHub requires that all tickets be sold for at least $6. MLB Renews Deal with StubHub, supra note 14. 
This measure is meant to assuage teams’ concerns about seeing their tickets listed for “pocket change.” Id. 
But it should not be interpreted as a price floor or a minimum amount at which a ticket may be listed for 
sale. See infra note 33. Instead, the $6 minimum is purely an “optic[al]” measure since the $6 includes users’ 
commissions and delivery fees, which were previously only assessed to buyers at checkout time—after they 
selected their tickets. MLB Renews Deal with StubHub, supra note 14. In fact, under the previous agreement, 
all buyers, regardless of the selling price, were charged at least $10.40 because of delivery and commission 
fees that were added to the total price. Id. The new deal also includes lower service and delivery fees for 
users. Wendy Thurm, MLB Re-Ups with StubHub but Yankees, Others Opt Out, FANGRAPHS (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/mlb-re-ups-with-stubhub-but-yankees-others-opt-out [https://perma.cc/
Q9JX-NR8N]. Thus, the 2012 agreement did not increase the ultimate price that baseball fans were 
paying to buy tickets on StubHub; rather, in some cases, the price actually decreased. 
21 See infra Part I. 
22 See infra Part I. 
23 See, e.g., ANTHONY J. DREYER & KAREN HOFFMAN LENT, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, 
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, KEY TAKEAWAYS: THE EMERGING LEGAL LANDSCAPE REGARDING 
TICKET SALES: WHAT EVERY SPORTS/EVENT ORGANIZER OR VENUE NEEDS TO KNOW 3-5 
(2016), https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/NY_Emerging_Legal_Landscape_
Webinar_Takeaway_030716.pdf [https://perma.cc/M48G-ND6W] (discussing the antitrust implications 
of team policies that limit the extent to which ticket holders can resell their tickets on the secondary 
market); Shepard Goldfein & James Keyte, Sports Tickets: Revocable Licenses or Rights to Resale?, N.Y. L.J. 
(Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202754628324/Sports-Tickets-Revocable-
Licenses-or-Rights-to-Resale?slreturn=20160405234921#ixzz46DHH5mgG [https://perma.cc/5MAH-
E42V] (discussing various types of resale restrictions that teams impose on ticket holders). 
24 Darren Rovell, StubHub’s Antitrust Lawsuit Against Warriors, Ticketmaster Dismissed, ESPN (Nov. 
6, 2015), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/14063815/stubhub-antitrust-lawsuit-golden-state-warriors-
ticketmaster-dismissed [https://perma.cc/R6TV-YV9V]. 
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limitations and other team-imposed conditions “generally are fully enforceable.”25 
Stephen Happel and Marianne M. Jennings explain, 
[O]wners of professional sports teams state that consumers actually 
purchase a “license” to a seat and the license is subject to certain rules. 
If the ticket is treated as a license, owners use their right of revocation 
of these licenses of those season ticket holders who try to resell tickets 
at above face-value to games they cannot or do not want to attend.26 
The revocable license characterization provides teams with a very potent weapon 
since, as a matter of property law, revocable licenses can be terminated by the 
grantor at any time and for any reason.27 
The notion of sports tickets as revocable licenses has led courts to uphold 
various team-imposed restrictions on ticket holders, including resale restrictions.28 
Not surprisingly, teams have begun to use the revocable license language in their 
season ticket holder policies and agreements.29 Thus, both common law property 
doctrines and standard contemporary contractual agreements between season 
ticket holders and teams support primary sellers’ efforts to restrict ticket resellers. 
StubHub and other resale sites do not seem to stand much of a chance. 
But in this Comment, I argue that lawmakers should reconsider the extent 
to which they allow teams to continue to use the revocable license rule to 
restrict ticket holders’ resale rights. In Part I, I provide an overview of the 
measures that teams have implemented to restrict the resale of tickets. In Part 
II, I explain how the concept of tickets as revocable licenses has played a key 
role in establishing and perpetuating an industry-wide norm that favors teams’ 
rights over those of their fans—especially in the resale context—and I show 
how teams continue to rely on that concept to defend resale restrictions. 
 
25 Anthony J. Dreyer & Mitchell P. Schwartz, Whose Game Is It Anyway: Sport Teams’ Right to 
Restrict (and Control) Ticket Resale, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 766 (2007). 
26 Stephen Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, The Eight Principles of the Microeconomic and 
Regulatory Future of Ticket Scalping, Ticket Brokers, and Secondary Ticket Markets, 28 J.L. & COM. 115, 180-81 
(2010). The notion of tickets as licenses has been applied to both season ticket subscriptions and individual 
game tickets. But in the resale context, the concept has been more influential in disputes concerning season 
ticket agreements. Teams have more leverage to impose restrictions on season ticket holders than on fans 
who merely purchase single-game tickets. For example, teams have threatened to revoke a fan’s season tickets 
or refused to renew a fan’s tickets the following season. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 30–31.  
27 Marrone v. Wash. Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1913). 
28 See infra text accompanying notes 64–74. 
29 See, e.g., Season Ticket Holder Terms and Conditions, PHILA. FLYERS, http://flyers.nhl.com/v2/
ext/160418STH_TandC_1617FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8Q2-J6MA] (“Each ticket purchased 
as part of your Season Ticket Plan . . . constitutes a revocable license. As a revocable license, each 
Ticket may be revoked at any time . . . for any reason . . . .”); Terms & Conditions Relating to Golden State 
Warriors Ticket Plans, WARRIORS.COM, http://www.nba.com/warriors/tickets/ticket_terms_and_conditions.
html [https://perma.cc/P9VH-LCPA] (“Ticket plans and all rights attendant thereto are owned by the 
Warriors. Ticket plans are revocable licenses . . . .”). 
440 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 433 
In Part III, I illustrate how the revocable license rule, though widely 
accepted today, has always rested on questionable grounds. Indeed, the 
characterization of tickets as revocable licenses was criticized and often 
rejected by early twentieth century courts and academics for seemingly 
providing a legal justification to proprietors who wished to arbitrarily exclude 
innocent ticket-holding patrons. But business incentives generally prevented 
early twentieth century proprietors from abusing the rule to the detriment of 
innocent patrons. In turn, I argue that early proponents of the rule had reason 
to ignore its dangerously wide scope and that the rule was originally adopted 
for a very limited purpose—namely, to protect a proprietor’s right to exclude 
unruly patrons by ensuring that no jury could ever find against a proprietor 
in that situation. 
In Part IV, I contend that courts and scholars have gradually—but 
improperly—extended the rule of tickets as revocable licenses such that 
primary ticket vendors now wield a kind of unilateral power over ticket 
holders that the original proponents of the rule never intended to establish. 
This is especially concerning in the current secondary resale market because 
teams are now confronted with significant financial incentives to exploit the 
revocable license rule to the fullest extent possible. Thus, the modern ticket 
market is missing one of the critical assumptions that supported the rule’s 
original adoption: the belief that proprietors would not use the rule to 
legitimize unjust practices. Therefore, I argue that lawmakers should stop 
allowing the notion of tickets as revocable licenses to inform the industry’s 
conception of ticket holders’ rights. Finally, freed from the rigid and outdated 
assumptions of the revocable license rule, I explore what can be done going 
forward to account for the legitimate concerns of both ticket holders and 
teams, and I propose various legislative solutions. Most importantly, my goal 
is to inspire lawmakers to reconsider the continued viability of the revocable 
license rule. This early twentieth century characterization should not dictate 
our approach to twenty-first century issues. 
I. CURRENT TEAM-IMPOSED RESALE RESTRICTIONS 
As teams’ concerns with secondary resales have grown, some have begun to 
implement initiatives to address the secondary market’s effect on their businesses. 
These efforts have ranged from establishing separate team-managed resale 
exchanges—while prohibiting ticket holders from using other sites—to adopting 
ticket delivery policies that functionally limit fans’ ability to transact on the 
secondary market. By restricting ticket holders’ resale rights and capabilities, teams 
hope to both curb the proliferation of the secondary ticket market and capture 
a greater portion of secondary resale revenues. 
2017] Revoking the Revocable License Rule 441 
For example, the Golden State Warriors of the National Basketball 
Association (NBA) formed an official secondary ticket exchange through a 
partnership with Ticketmaster, and the team prohibits season ticket holders 
from selling tickets on unofficial exchanges like StubHub. Fans have alleged 
that the team “contractually require[s] that the resale of Warriors tickets be 
effectuated only through Ticketmaster’s Secondary Ticket Exchange” and 
enforces this requirement by cancelling the ticket subscriptions of fans who 
resell their Warriors tickets through a nonaffiliated secondary ticket exchange.30 
Likewise, the New Jersey Devils of the National Hockey League (NHL) have 
allegedly refused to renew season ticket subscriptions of fans whom they 
catch selling tickets on secondary market websites.31 These policies pressure 
fans into using team-managed ticket exchanges.  
Relatedly, the Minnesota Timberwolves—also of the NBA—have used 
the Flash Seats ticket platform to implement a paperless ticket policy that 
requires ticket holders to use a smart phone or present a driver’s license or 
credit card to gain entry to the arena.32 The team requires that all resales be 
conducted through its official Flash Seats platform, which maintains a 75% 
price floor.33 Moreover, like fans who purchase through Flash Seats, season 
ticket holders who buy directly from the team do not actually receive tickets; 
they simply enter the arena by presenting their credit card or identification.34 
Because Timberwolves fans do not have access to any type of physical or 
digital ticket that can be transferred to someone else, season ticket holders 
cannot sell tickets on sites like StubHub and are forced to use the team’s Flash 
Seats platform. 
Other teams, stopping short of entirely restricting ticket sales on secondary 
market sites, have implemented policies that functionally limit a ticket holder’s 
ability to resell tickets. For example, before the 2015 season, the San Francisco 
49ers of the National Football League (NFL) transitioned away from issuing 
traditional hard stock tickets to season ticket holders by implementing an 
 
30 StubHub, Inc. v. Golden State Warriors, LLC, No. 15-1436, 2015 WL 6755594, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 5, 2015). 
31 Zachary Zagger, NJ Devils Sued for Restricting Season Ticket Resales, LAW360 (Apr. 23, 2015, 
7:26 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/646523/nj-devils-sued-for-restricting-season-ticket-resales 
[https://perma.cc/YP3N-M5L6]. 
32 Timberwolves Season-Ticket Holders Sue Team over Ticket Policy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.si.com/nba/2016/03/04/minnesota-timberwolves-ticket-policy-fans-lawsuit 
[https://perma.cc/5JKP-J3TJ]. 
33 Id. A price floor, a minimum dollar amount for which a ticket can be listed, sometimes 
precludes sellers from choosing a price level that buyers find appropriate for a low-demand game 
and, as a result, limits the extent to which secondary sales detract from the team’s primary ticket 
selling efforts. Id. 
34 Id. 
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exclusive electronic delivery method.35 In addition, the team refuses to release 
tickets to ticket holders until seventy-two hours before each game,36 severely 
limiting the amount of time ticket holders have to freely resell their tickets. 
The 49ers do allow fans to resell tickets in advance of the seventy-two hour 
window through the team’s official resale exchange, but the team does not 
actually release the tickets until three days before each game.37 As a result, 
before the three-day window, ticket holders cannot use unofficial exchanges 
like StubHub because they do not have access to their tickets and are 
therefore unable to post them for sale. 
Similarly, for more than three years,38 the New York Yankees ran their 
own team-managed secondary ticket exchange that competed with secondary 
resale sites like StubHub. In 2012, both the Yankees and the Los Angeles 
Angels opted out of MLB’s new agreement with StubHub.39 A spokesperson 
for the Yankees defended the move by predicting that the team would be able 
to lift attendance by 5000 fans per game by disaffiliating from StubHub.40 In 
addition, the Yankees were reportedly upset that tickets for Yankees games 
were often available on StubHub for less than $5.00, which is significantly 
below the team’s lowest face value price.41 Months later, the Yankees announced 
a new partnership with Ticketmaster and the launch of the Yankees Ticket 
Exchange, “the only official online resale marketplace for Yankees fans to 
purchase and resell tickets to Yankees games.”42 Unlike StubHub, the Yankees 
Ticket Exchange set a price floor for every game.43 By preventing tickets from 
being listed for bargain basement price levels, the price floor limited the extent to 
which secondary sales undercut primary ticket sales. Moreover, the arrangement 
 
35 Chris Nguyen, Many Unhappy San Francisco 49ers Fans Selling Season Ticket Licenses, ABC7 
NEWS (Sept. 29, 2015), http://abc7news.com/sports/many-unhappy-49ers-fans-selling-season-ticket-
licenses/1009042 [https://perma.cc/WGU2-LMJP]. 
36 Id. 
37 Jeff Zalesin, 49ers Fans Say Season Ticket Resale Rule Harms Competition, LAW360 (Aug. 6, 
2015, 1:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/688070/49ers-fans-say-season-ticket-resale-rule-harms-
competition [https://perma.cc/WGU2-LMJP]. 
38 In June 2016, the Yankees and StubHub announced a six-year agreement to make StubHub the 
team’s official reseller once again. See infra text accompanying notes 52–54. The agreement includes a 
50% price floor. See infra text accompanying note 54. Evidence suggests that the price floor will result in 
hundreds of tickets per game being listed for prices that exceed their true market value. See infra text 
accompanying note 163. 
39 Yankees Close to Deal with Ticketmaster After Opting Out of StubHub Contract, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY (Dec. 11, 2012), http://m.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2012/12/
11/Franchises/Yankees.aspx [https://perma.cc/KMT7-LQGK]. 
40 Id. 
41 Thurm, supra note 20. 
42 Press Release, N.Y. Yankees, Yankees Announce Launch of Official Yankees Ticket Exchange 
for Fans (Feb. 11, 2013), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/41540894/yankees-announce-launch-of-official-
yankees-ticket-exchange-for-fans [https://perma.cc/U9Z3-VN4G].  
43 Jared Diamond, A Pitched Battle over Yankees’ Ticket Policy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2016, at A15. 
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was beneficial to the Yankees because the team kept all of the transaction fees 
charged to fans buying and selling tickets on the Exchange rather than sharing 
the revenue with StubHub. While fans could still buy and sell Yankees tickets 
on StubHub, the Exchange made doing so a much less convenient option.44 
Relatedly, starting with the 2016 season, the Yankees further undercut 
secondary sales on nonaffiliated exchanges by refusing to accept print-at-home 
tickets.45 This new policy was a “huge blow” to StubHub since StubHub 
“primarily uses print-at-home tickets.”46 In other words, the Yankees eliminated 
one of StubHub’s best features—namely, the ability to simply print out a ticket 
rather than waiting for it in the mail or picking it up in person. The new policy 
required fans to use traditional hard stock tickets or mobile tickets through a 
smartphone.47 But the mobile ticket option was only available to fans who 
purchased directly from the Yankees or through the Yankees Ticket Exchange.48 
Thus, the sale of Yankees tickets on StubHub was limited to old-fashioned hard 
stock tickets. Sellers would have to physically mail their tickets, an inconvenience 
that fans “lamented” since they could “no longer do what they had done for 
years—print out tickets at home.”49 The team attributed the new policy to 
 
44 The Exchange used an exclusive barcode transfer system, which allowed a seller to simply 
type in the ticket’s barcode and a buyer to download the tickets or pick them up at the stadium. 
Patrick Wall, Yankees Balk at New StubHub Ticket Pick-Up Center Outside Stadium, DNAINFO (Feb. 28, 
2013, 6:57 AM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20130228/concourse/yankees-balk-at-new-stubhub-
ticket-pick-up-center-outside-stadium [https://perma.cc/UC6M-YS7A]. These benefits were exclusive to the 
Exchange and were meant to “lure fans from StubHub”: Yankees tickets could not be electronically 
delivered through StubHub unless the seller already had an electronic version of the ticket that could 
be directly uploaded to the site, in contrast to indirectly uploading the ticket by typing in the barcode 
found on both electronic tickets and physical, hard stock tickets. See id. The Exchange’s electronic 
transfer system mirrored StubHub’s agreement with MLB, which allows StubHub to perform a similar 
electronic delivery service for the tickets of teams that have not opted out of the deal. StubHub Seller 
FAQ, supra note 12.  
45 Press Release, N.Y. Yankees, Yankees Announce On-Sale Dates for 2016 Regular Season 
Individual Game Tickets (Feb. 15, 2016), http://m.yankees.mlb.com/news/article/164530958 [https://
perma.cc/U9Z3-VN4G]. 
46 You’re Outta Here: Yankees Discontinue Print-at-Home Tickets, CBS N.Y. (Feb. 17, 2016, 10:30 PM), 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2016/02/17/youre-outta-here-new-york-yankees-discontinue-print-at-
home-tickets [https://perma.cc/W79Y-628K]. 
47 Mark Emery, By Banning Print-at-Home Tickets, Yankees Hurt Fans Served by StubHub’s Open 
Market, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 23, 2016, 2:36 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/baseball/yankees/
banning-print-at-home-tickets-yankees-hurt-fans-stubhub-article-1.2541220 [https://perma.cc/PW68-3S28]. 
48 Id. 
49 Seth Berkman, StubHub Will Serve as Yankees’ Ticket Reseller, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/sports/baseball/yankees-and-stubhub-announce-a-ticket-part
nership.html [https://perma.cc/KW33-ZXXD]. In response, StubHub established a last-minute ticket 
center close to Yankee Stadium in time for the 2016 season. See Nate Schweber, Some Yankees Tickets 
Require a Long Walk, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/sports/baseball/
some-yankees-tickets-require-a-long-walk.html [https://perma.cc/BV3U-YFQT]. This allowed sellers to 
ship the tickets to StubHub before a secondary buyer even decided to purchase them. See id. Fans 
could then purchase tickets very close to the time of the event and pick them up just before the 
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consumer protection concerns, insisting that the use of print-at-home tickets 
inevitably leads to fraud,50 but many believed that the Yankees actually 
implemented the policy to deter sales on StubHub.51 The idea was that the 
Yankees were making it more difficult for fans to use StubHub so that they 
would move their business to the Yankees Ticket Exchange. 
Finally, in June 2016, after “years of feuding” with StubHub, the Yankees 
announced that they reached an agreement with StubHub for the reseller to 
become their official secondary ticket exchange.52 Both sides have agreed to 
split the profits from the resale of tickets, and the Yankees are guaranteed at 
least $50 million over the course of the six-year agreement.53 Most importantly, 
the agreement includes a price floor of 50% of the face value of each ticket, a 
departure from StubHub’s tradition of promoting “an open marketplace 
[without price floors], where the public [demand] sets the price.”54 In other 
words, despite re-affiliating with StubHub, the Yankees are maintaining 
extensive control over the resale of their tickets and, in doing so, significantly 
detracting from their fans’ ability to buy and sell tickets at market-level prices.55 
II. HOW TEAMS GET AWAY WITH THIS:                                                  
THE REVOCABLE LICENSE RULE 
Fortunately for teams, the law appears to support their efforts to restrict 
ticket holders’ resale rights. In this Part, I explore the legal justifications that 
teams use to defend these restrictions. I begin by discussing what is widely 
considered the uncontroversial black letter law of ticket holder rights—namely, 
the revocable license rule—and I explain how courts consistently apply this 
 
game. See id. But many Yankees fans were frustrated by this arrangement. See id. (explaining fans’ frustration 
with their inability to print their tickets from the StubHub website and describing the unpleasantly long 
and “frigid walk” from the 161st Street Yankee Stadium subway stop to the StubHub ticket office). 
50 Press Release, N.Y. Yankees, supra note 45. 
51 See, e.g., Matt Bonesteel, Here’s Why the Yankees Are Getting Rid of Print-at-Home Tickets, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2016/02/17/heres-
why-the-yankees-are-getting-rid-of-print-at-home-tickets [https://perma.cc/E5B2-63VC] (“[T]he Yankees 
probably have an ulterior motive for this, namely that they’ve been at war with StubHub for years now.”); see 
also Berkman, supra note 49 (“[M]any perceived the new policy as a way to exclude StubHub from a good 
chunk of the Yankees’ ticket market because StubHub did not have the means to distribute Yankees 
tickets through mobile devices.”). Even scholars are generally skeptical of primary ticket sellers’ stated 
consumer protection justifications for resale restrictions. See, e.g., Happel & Jennings, supra note 26, at 
180 (explaining that while primary ticket sellers’ efforts to limit the operations of the secondary market 
“are ostensibly made in the name of consumer protection,” the “ultimate effects are limited consumer 
options through reduced competition”). 
52 Berkman, supra note 49. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See infra note 163 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the price floor will 
negatively affect fans. 
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rule in favor of teams and to the detriment of fans. I then discuss recent litigation 
concerning the types of resale restrictions described in Part I, showing how 
teams continue to rely on the revocable license rule to justify these restrictions. 
Likewise, I explain how industry insiders widely accept the revocable license rule 
as the governing principle of ticket holder rights. 
A. The Revocable License Rule Today 
The current black letter law of ticket holder rights is that tickets are mere 
licenses, revocable at the will of the proprietor. The rule can be traced to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club.56 In Marrone, 
the Court held that the defendant-proprietor was free to exclude the plaintiff 
from a racetrack despite the plaintiff ’s lawfully purchased ticket.57 The plaintiff 
was not entitled to specific performance, and the Court strictly limited any 
damages to the face value price of the ticket.58 The Court reached this conclusion 
because the “ticket was not a conveyance of an interest in the race track.”59 
Instead, the ticket was a mere license to enter someone else’s property for a 
limited period of time.60 The ticket could be revoked at any time because the 
ticket holder did not actually have a property-based right to attend the event.61 
This notion of tickets as fully revocable licenses is now widely accepted 
by academics and industry professionals as the governing rule for property 
rights in tickets.62 As such, the rule provides teams with valuable legal ammunition 
in their efforts to restrict ticket holders’ resale rights. As Shepard Goldfein and 
James Keyte—two prominent sports attorneys—explain, “Historically, courts 
have viewed an event ticket as a revocable license to attend an event, with no 
absolute right to sell or transfer that license.”63 Thus, courts have consistently 
invoked the revocable license rule to uphold team-imposed resale restrictions. 
For instance, in Soderholm v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., the court 
upheld the Chicago Cubs’ decision to refuse to renew the plaintiff ’s season 
tickets.64 The Cubs made the decision after learning that the plaintiff resold 
some of his tickets for higher than face value prices, a violation of the team’s 
 
56 227 U.S. 633 (1913). 
57 Id. at 636-37. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 636. 
60 Id. at 637. 
61 Id. at 636-37. 
62 See, e.g., Dreyer & Schwartz, supra note 25, at 766 (“Since at least as far back as 1886, courts 
have held that an admission ticket to an entertainment venue is a license of a personal nature, and 
is freely revocable . . . .”); see also Davis, supra note 1, at 246 & n.37 (citing Marrone for the “commonly 
accepted rule” that a ticket is nothing more than a license to witness a specific performance, which the 
proprietor may revoke at will for any reason). 
63 Goldfein & Keyte, supra note 23. 
64 587 N.E.2d 517, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
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resale policy.65 The court rejected the plaintiff ’s characterization of the season 
ticket plan as a lease or option contract and denied his action for specific 
performance to compel renewal.66 Instead, the court held that a season ticket 
plan constitutes nothing more than a “series of [revocable] licenses” that 
permit an individual to attend a specific game in a specific seat.67 
Similarly, People v. Waisvisz upheld the constitutionality of a ticket scalping 
law and dismissed the defendant’s objection that the law unconstitutionally 
granted event sponsors “the power to determine who will be allowed to engage 
in the business of ticket brokering.”68 The court explained that the Illinois 
statute, which prohibited ticket resales for higher than face value prices, merely 
“g[ave] effect to the[] common law rights” of ticket holders: “A ticket to a 
sporting or entertainment event is a license which may be revoked at the will 
of its issuer.”69 Consequently, “an event sponsor may impose restrictions on the 
transferability of tickets which it issues.”70  
Likewise, in In re Harrell, the Ninth Circuit held that under Arizona law, 
a trustee could not sell a debtor’s opportunity to renew Phoenix Suns season 
tickets because “the debtor’s revocable opportunity to renew season tickets is 
not a property right.”71 Furthermore, in Kully v. Goldman, the Supreme Court 
of Nebraska refused to enforce an agreement between fans for the permanent 
sale of an option to renew football season tickets because the current ticket 
holder’s expectation that he would be offered the same seats each year “was 
not . . . a property right which he could enforce.”72 Most recently, in Frager v. 
Indianapolis Colts, Inc., the Southern District of Indiana cited the revocable 
license rule in granting the Colts’ motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by a 
former season ticket holder after the team declined to renew his ninety-four 
season tickets.73 These examples show that courts have consistently applied the 
revocable license rule beyond the resale context to resolve other disputes 
 
65 Id. at 518. 
66 Id. at 520-21. 
67 Id. 
68 582 N.E.2d 1383, 1386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 73 F.3d 218, 220 (9th Cir. 1996). 
72 305 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Neb. 1981). 
73 No. 1:16-cv-632, 2016 WL 6610854, at *1-3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16 
CV 632 (7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2016); see also Zachary Zagger, Colts Accused of Not Renewing Broker’s Season 
Tickets, LAW360 (Mar. 22, 2016, 6:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/774704/colts-accused-of-not-
renewing-broker-s-season-tickets [https://perma.cc/YJ9Y-SBGX] (“An Indianapolis Colts season 
ticket broker sued the football team in Indiana federal court . . . , alleging the Colts have refused to 
renew his 94 season tickets for the upcoming season . . . .”). The plaintiff subsequently appealed the 
decision to the Seventh Circuit. Zachary Zagger, Broker Takes Colts Season Ticket Fight to 7th Circ., 
LAW360 (Dec. 21, 2016, 6:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/875567/broker-takes-colts-season-
ticket-fight-to-7th-circ [https://perma.cc/NT8H-UZS8]. 
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between fans and teams in favor of the latter.74 Thus, notwithstanding a few 
exceptions,75 courts have routinely applied the rule in favor of teams and to 
the detriment of ticket holders and fans. 
 
74 See Pollock v. Nat’l Football League, 553 F. App’x 270, 270 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal 
of the Super Bowl ticket–purchasing plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim, which stemmed 
from the NFL’s failure to provide the specifically purchased seats, and requiring the plaintiffs to sue 
under contract for the face value of the tickets because “the entire suit [wa]s grounded in the purchase 
of tickets, commonly regarded as revocable licenses”); Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 530 F.3d 1320, 
1329 (11th Cir. 2008) (reversing lower court decision finding that a mandatory pat-down policy for entry 
to a stadium violated the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the ticket 
holder consented to the pat-down, and tickets to NFL games grant the holder “at most a revocable 
license to a seat,” meaning the team “retained the right to exclude him from the Stadium for any 
reason”); Yarde Metals, Inc. v. New England Patriots Ltd. P’ship, 834 N.E.2d 1233, 1235-36, 1238 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2005) (observing that the “purchase of a ticket to a sports or entertainment event typically 
creates nothing more than a revocable license” and affirming dismissal of season ticket holder’s suit 
against the New England Patriots for revoking season tickets after plaintiff ’s friend, while using 
plaintiff ’s tickets, misbehaved by throwing bottles); Bickett v. Buffalo Bills, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 245, 
246-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (holding that since admission tickets are revocable licenses, the Buffalo 
Bills could cancel games during a player’s strike without breaching any contractual duties to its ticket 
holders); cf. Williams v. Nat’l Football League, No. 14-1089, 2014 WL 5514378, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 
31, 2014) (finding that the Clayton Act does not apply to football tickets since they are revocable licenses 
and dismissing visiting team fan’s antitrust claims against the team for its policy of limiting playoff 
ticket purchases to fans who reside in the home team’s area). 
75 Davis highlights two cases in which bankruptcy courts have found a property-based interest in 
season tickets to argue that “courts have begun to look beyond the contract terms to the policies of the 
teams” and “find weight in the intangible expectation of renewal created by season ticket holder status.” 
Davis, supra note 1, at 251. For example, in In re I.D. Craig Service Corp., the court looked beyond the 
language on each ticket, which indicated that the ticket was a revocable license, because the team’s 
policies and actions contradicted such an approach and instead “created an expectancy interest in the 
renewal rights of season ticket holders.” Id. at 250 (citing In re I.D. Craig Service Corp., 138 B.R. 490, 
495 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992)). Specifically, the team’s ticket holder handbook referred to a season ticket 
holder as an “owner” and stated that the ticket holder could transfer his ownership to others. In re I.D. 
Craig Service Corp., 138 B.R. at 498 n.15. Thus, the court found that the ticket holder’s renewal rights 
were “valuable assets” that could be sold in bankruptcy. Id. at 495. 
While encouraging for ticket holders and fans, these decisions should not be interpreted as a 
departure from the longstanding tradition of viewing tickets as revocable licenses. Instead, these 
decisions only amount to interpretations of contractual agreements between ticket holders and 
teams. Therefore, a ruling regarding the contractually agreed upon relationship between the 
Pittsburgh Steelers and their season ticket holders, for example, has no bearing on the relationship 
between other teams and their fans. Indeed, in In re Liebman, the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of the Chicago Bulls and against a bankruptcy 
trustee seeking to sell a debtor’s season ticket renewal option. 208 B.R. 38, 41 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). 
In doing so, the court noted that “[t]he key factor that distinguishes . . . the cases relied upon by the 
trustee [such as In re I.D. Craig Service Corp.] is how [the Bulls] treat[] the renewal rights of season 
ticket holders.” Id. at 40. The court proceeded to detail how the Bulls maintained a clear and 
consistent policy of treating season tickets as fully revocable licenses. Id. Still, while these cases may 
not demonstrate a break with the traditional notion of tickets as revocable licenses, they are helpful 
insofar as they explore the continued vitality of the revocable license rule in the context of 
contractual season ticket agreements between fans and teams. This issue will become more 
important as more teams begin to incorporate the revocable license rule in their contractual 
agreements with fans. See infra subsection IV.C.2 for a more in-depth discussion of this issue and 
my proposed solutions. 
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B. The Revocable License Rule Applied to Current  
Resale Restrictions and Recent Litigation 
Teams continue to use the rule of tickets as revocable licenses to support 
their attempts to restrict ticket holders’ rights. Furthermore, industry 
insiders, including sports lawyers, continue to believe in the rule’s vitality and 
its relevance to team-imposed resale restrictions. Indeed, teams have relied 
on the rule to defend against recent litigation challenging such restrictions. 
For example, StubHub sued to challenge the Warriors’ policy of cancelling 
season ticket subscriptions of fans who resell tickets through unofficial exchanges.76 
StubHub claimed that the Warriors and Ticketmaster had monopolized the ticket 
resale market in violation of federal and state antitrust law by excluding all other 
secondary ticket exchange options.77 In their initial motion to dismiss, the Warriors 
argued that any agreement between the Warriors and their fans regarding resale 
restrictions does not constitute an anticompetitive agreement in restraint of trade 
because “[a] ticket to a sporting event is a revocable license, and a licensor has 
long been permitted to impose restrictions on its licensees, including a complete 
restriction on transferability.”78 In a subsequent motion to dismiss, the Warriors 
argued that StubHub could not even allege that the Warriors and their fans made 
any kind of agreement since “[a]s the issuer of a revocable license, the Warriors 
can unilaterally impose ticket limitations, including resale restrictions” and 
“[s]uch unilateral conduct does not constitute an agreement under Section 1 
of the Sherman Act.”79 The district court dismissed the lawsuit, and after 
StubHub appealed to the Ninth Circuit,80 the parties settled.81 
 
76 See supra text accompanying note 30. 
77 Vin Gurrieri, Warriors, Ticketmaster Teamed to Block Resales: StubHub, LAW360 (Mar. 30, 2015, 
1:06 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/636952/warriors-ticketmaster-teamed-to-block-resales-stub
hub [https://perma.cc/UY74-NJP6]. 
78 Defendant Golden State Warriors LLC’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion to Dismiss at 23, StubHub, Inc. 
v. Golden State Warriors, LLC, No. 15-1436, 2015 WL 6755594 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2015). 
79 Defendant Golden State Warriors, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint 
and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion to Dismiss at 24, StubHub, 
Inc. v. Golden State Warriors, LLC, No. 15-1436, 2015 WL 6755594 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2015) (citing 
Soderholm v. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 517, 520 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)). 
80 Kali Hays, StubHub Takes Warriors Ticket Antitrust Suit to 9th Circ., LAW360 (Dec. 2, 2015, 
1:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/732958/stubhub-takes-warriors-ticket-antitrust-suit-to-9th-circ 
[https://perma.cc/64RX-XXZ6]. The district court did not discuss the revocable license rule in its 
opinion. Instead, the court found that StubHub’s federal antitrust claims failed because StubHub 
could not allege a sufficient product market as required by the Sherman Act. StubHub, 2015 WL 
6755594, at *3. Since the court found that StubHub failed to adequately allege this threshold matter 
of antitrust liability, the court did not reach the revocable license issue. Id. at *4. 
81 See Order at 1, StubHub, Inc. v. Ticketmaster, LLC, No. 15-17362 (9th Cir. July 22, 2016) 
(“Pursuant to the parties’ stipulated agreement . . . , this appeal is voluntarily dismissed.”). 
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Similarly, in their motion to dismiss a season ticket holder class action suit, the 
New Jersey Devils defended their right to refuse to renew season ticket 
subscriptions, noting that season ticket holders receive nothing more than a 
“revocable license to each game.”82 The breach of contract suit was brought by fans 
who alleged that the Devils refused to renew their ticket plans after discovering 
that they had resold many of their tickets on unofficial resale exchanges. Likewise, 
in their motion to dismiss a class action suit brought by season ticket holders upset 
with the team’s seventy-two-hour ticket release policy,83 the San Francisco 49ers 
countered the plaintiffs’ trespass to chattels claim by arguing that a ticket holder 
“has no property in a game ticket” since a ticket grants its holder nothing more than 
a revocable license to sit in a particular seat.84 The plaintiffs have since dropped the 
lawsuit.85 Finally, in Frager, the Colts successfully defended their decision to revoke 
ninety-four season tickets of a Pennsylvania-based ticket broker, arguing that “[t]he 
majority of courts to face the issue . . . [have held] that a season ticket holder does 
not enjoy any property rights beyond that of a traditional revocable license.”86 
These teams’ reliance on the revocable license rule underscores the rule’s 
continued vitality in the ongoing resale rights battles between teams and ticket 
holders.87 Indeed, Goldfein and Keyte, reflecting on these recent cases, explain, 
 
82 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant New Jersey Devils, LLC’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 11, Olsen v. N.J. Devils, LLC, No. 15-02807 (D.N.J. June 3, 2015), ECF No. 8-1. The 
Devils also cited to Soderholm for the proposition that season tickets constitute nothing more than a 
“series of revocable licenses.” Id. at 22 (quoting Soderholm, 587 N.E.2d at 521). In June 2016, the 
parties settled the lawsuit; the terms of the agreement were not disclosed. Matthew Perlman, NJ 
Devils Settle Resale Suit with Ticket Holders, LAW360 (June 10, 2016, 5:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/806030 [https://perma.cc/4AZN-U7PX]. 
83 See supra text accompanying notes 35–37. 
84 Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Forty Niners Football Company LLC to 
Dismiss; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 16, Kazemzadeh v. S.F. 
49ers, No. 5-03593 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016) (case dismissed). 
85 Jeff Zalesin, Ticket Holder Drops Resale Suit Against 49ers, Ticketmaster, LAW360 (Jan. 14, 2016, 
7:13 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/746878/ticket-holder-drops-resale-suit-against-49ers-ticket
master [https://perma.cc/NY29-MKRQ]. Other teams, without specifically citing the revocable license rule, 
have defended efforts to restrict secondary market sales by pointing to the underlying spirit of the rule, 
arguing that proprietors have complete control over the sale of tickets. For example, Yankees President 
Randy Levine justified the decision to eliminate paper tickets by noting, “This is our product and our 
inventory . . . . We have the ultimate right to protect the value of our inventory . . . .” Diamond, supra note 43. 
86 Memorandum in Support of Defendant Indianapolis Colts, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff ’s Complaint at 6-7, Frager v. Indianapolis Colts, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-632, 2016 WL 6610854 
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2016). In granting the Colts’ motion to dismiss, the court relied on both general 
property law conceptions of tickets and a specific analysis of the Colts’ season ticket policies. See 
Frager v. Indianapolis Colts, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-632, 2016 WL 6610854, at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2016) 
(granting the Colts’ motion to dismiss because “the multitude of cases cited by the [Colts] have 
found that a season ticket holder does not have a right to renew” and specifically observing that the 
“clear and unambiguous language of the invoice makes clear that the Colts have retained the right 
to reject any renewal”), appeal docketed, No. 16 CV 632 (7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2016). 
87 Two recently filed lawsuits also merit a brief discussion. In late March 2016, Minnesota 
Timberwolves season ticket holders brought a lawsuit against the team’s newly implemented paperless 
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“[C]hallenges to resale restrictions have resulted in court opinions confirming the 
historical view that tickets are mere licenses to attend rather than property to 
resell,” showing that “the long held view that tickets do not include a right of resale 
may still be applicable today.”88 Similarly, Joseph C. Sullivan, a commercial 
litigator at Taylor English Duma LLP, notes,  
[T]he problem for disgruntled ticket holders [seeking to challenge current 
resale restrictions] is that courts have generally viewed an event ticket as a 
license . . . that can be taken away at any time for almost any reason and that 
doesn’t give the holder an absolute right to transfer or resell that license.89 
 
ticket policy. See supra text accompanying notes 32–34. The fans alleged that the policy amounts to a 
breach of contract and a violation of various Minnesota laws. Nick Halter, Ticket Holders Sue Timberwolves 
over New Paperless Ticket Policy, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUS. J. (Mar. 3, 2016, 1:16 PM), http://www.
bizjournals.com/twincities/news/2016/03/03/ticket-holders-sue-timberwolves-over-new-paperless.html 
[https://perma.cc/5TEB-WGD5]. They argued that they would not have purchased the season tickets if 
they had known in advance about the policy. Id. Specifically, they contended that the combination of 
the team’s restriction on unofficial resale exchanges and the official exchange’s use of price floors 
prevented them from reselling their tickets to most games, especially given the team’s poor performance 
and the market’s unwillingness to purchase tickets at close to face value prices. Id. The Timberwolves 
moved to dismiss the suit. Andy Greder, Fan Lawsuit Argues “Bait and Switch” over Timberwolves Flash 
Seats, TWINCITIES.COM PIONEER PRESS (June 15, 2016, 8:34 AM), http://www.twincities.com/2016/
06/13/fraud-case-against-timberwolves-heads-to-court [https://perma.cc/JP4V-4FXQ]. In the end, the team 
was successful in having the case sent to arbitration. Andy Greder, Timberwolves Earn Victory in Ticketing 
Lawsuit, TWINCITIES.COM PIONEER PRESS (Oct. 14, 2016, 3:48 PM), http://www.twincities.com/
2016/10/14/timberwolves-earn-victory-in-ticketing-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/68CS-WG9R]. 
Additionally, in August 2016, football fans filed a class action in the Northern District of Ohio 
against the NFL and the Pro Football Hall of Fame following the League’s abrupt decision to cancel 
the annual Hall of Fame exhibition game based on poor field conditions. Lawsuit Seeks $5M from 
NFL over Hall of Fame Game Cancellation, ESPN (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/
id/17276634/class-action-lawsuit-seeks-5-million-damages-nfl-hall-fame-game-cancellation [https://perma.
cc/6RA8-5EZS]. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the NFL and Pro Football Hall of Fame 
caused the field to be unplayable through their last-minute attempts to paint logos on the field and 
that they knew the field was unplayable hours before making an official announcement, leaving fans 
to travel to the stadium and purchase concessions and souvenirs. Zachary Zagger, NFL, Hall of Fame 
Ignoring Bid to Stop ‘Improper’ Offers, LAW360 (Sept. 16, 2016, 6:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
840938 [https://perma.cc/47JY-D36H]. While the league offered to refund the face value price of each 
ticket and reimburse fans for one night of hotel accommodations, the suit seeks additional damages, 
including the actual price paid for each ticket, travel expenses, and the full cost of lodging. Id. Shortly 
after filing, the plaintiff ’s counsel dropped the suit and brought “an essentially identical” suit against the 
NFL and the Hall of Fame in the Central District of California. Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Defendant National Football League’s Joinder in Defendant National Football Museum, 
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Based upon Improper Venue and National Football League’s 
Separate Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim at 4, Herrick v. Natl’ Football League, No. 2:16-
cv-06324-TJH (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2016).  The NFL has moved to dismiss the suit for improper venue or, 
alternatively, to transfer the suit to the Northern District of Ohio, or if the court decides to reach the 
merits, to find that the NFL is not a proper party to the suit. Id. at 10. 
88 Goldfein & Keyte, supra note 23. 
89 Zachary Zagger, New Ticket Restrictions Could Be Risky for Teams, LAW360 (Mar. 25, 2016, 
5:26 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/776139/new-ticket-restrictions-could-be-risky-for-teams 
[https://perma.cc/DQ8K-JMRL]. 
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III. THE ORIGIN OF THE REVOCABLE LICENSE RULE  
AND ITS LIMITED INITIAL SCOPE 
At first glance, the plethora of case law and scholarship supporting the rule 
of tickets as revocable licenses appears to weigh strongly in favor of teams and 
against individual ticket holders. But a closer look at the origin of the revocable 
license rule demonstrates that teams should not have as much of an advantage 
as they have been given. In this Part, I outline the history of the rule of tickets 
as revocable licenses, beginning with the common law of England and 
continuing through the doctrine’s acceptance in the United States. I describe 
the intense early criticism of and departures from the rule to show that it did 
not originally enjoy the same kind of unquestioned acceptance that it does 
today. Similarly, I outline the ways in which courts initially avoided strict 
applications of the rule when a straightforward application would have led to 
an unjust outcome. Given this background, I argue that the rule’s original 
proponents never meant for it to be blindly applied in favor of proprietors. 
Instead, the rule served the very narrow purpose of protecting a proprietor’s 
right to exclude unruly patrons. Thus, lawmakers should reconsider the rule’s 
applicability in the current ticket resale context.  
A. The Foundational Cases 
The rule of tickets as revocable licenses begins with Wood v. Leadbitter, a 
mid-nineteenth-century English case.90 Scholars have cited Wood as representative 
of the black letter English law of its time regarding admission tickets.91 In 
Wood, the court upheld a horsetrack owner’s right to eject a patron who had 
purchased a valid ticket to watch a race, holding that the ticket was a mere 
license, revocable at any time, as opposed to a license coupled with a grant 
that entitled the ticket holder to a property interest in the land.92 The court 
reached that conclusion after noting that an incorporeal inheritance in land 
could only be granted by deed and observing that there was no deed in that 
particular case.93 In turn, the court explained that the ejected patron’s only 
 
90 (1845) 153 Eng. Rep. (Exch.) 351; 13 M. & W. 838. 
91 See, e.g., J.A.R., Licenses-Liability of Theater Proprietor for Ejectment of Patron, 8 TEX. L. REV. 
601, 601 (1930) (citing Wood for the “early English view [that] favored absolute revocability of the 
license to be upon the premises and allowed only a recovery of damages for the breach of the contract 
measured by the price paid for admission”); S.F.D., Comment, The Right of an Ejected Ticket-Holder 
to Recover in Tort, 26 YALE L.J. 395, 397 & n.5 (1917) (citing Wood as indicative of the nineteenth century 
English view that a ticket holder possessed a revocable license and that an ejected patron’s only remedy 
was an action for breach of contract). 
92 (1845) 153 Eng. Rep. (Exch.) at 358-59; 13 M. & W at 854-55.  
93 Id.; see also Bennett Liebman, The Supreme Court and Exclusions by Racetracks, 17 VILL. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 421, 436 (2010) (explaining Wood’s reasoning that “an admission ticket to the 
racetrack was a mere license uncoupled with any other rights to the property”). 
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remedy was to bring a breach of contract suit against the proprietor, through 
which the patron could only recover the price of the admission ticket.94 
Over fifty years later, in Marrone, the United States Supreme Court cited Wood 
for the “rule commonly accepted in this country from the English cases . . . that 
such tickets do not create a right in rem.”95 The Court ruled in favor of the 
defendant-racetrack, which had denied admission to the plaintiff despite his 
valid entry ticket.96 According to the Court, the ticket holder possessed nothing 
more than a license to enter, which was freely revocable by the proprietor for 
any reason; therefore, he was not entitled to specific performance, and his only 
remedy was to sue for breach of contract.97 The ticket holder did not have an 
“irrevocable right of entry,” and his ticket was “subject to be revoked” at any 
time and for any reason.98 
Nevertheless, the Court went further than Wood’s reasoning by discussing 
important policy considerations in support of the revocable license rule. The 
Court noted that the ticket “was not a conveyance of an interest in the racetrack, 
not only because it was not under seal but because by common understanding it 
did not purport to have that effect.”99 Thus, the Court moved beyond Wood’s 
analytical justification, the lack of a sealed deed. Similarly, the Court explained 
that “[t]here would be obvious inconveniences” if the ticket holder were held to 
possess a right in rem against the proprietor.100 This suggested that the Court’s 
decision was driven more by policy considerations than by fundamental property 
law concepts. Still, the Marrone Court’s adoption of the rule that tickets are 
revocable licenses shortly became recognized as the governing American law 
regarding property rights in tickets.101 
B. Early Criticisms of the Rule and Departures from It 
A closer look at the case law and legal scholarship from the period 
immediately following Marrone demonstrates that the revocable license rule 
was not as well-received in its own time as we might expect given its wide 
acceptance as the governing rule today. Courts and academic commentary 
 
94 Wood, (1845) 153 Eng. Rep. (Exch.) at 359; 13 M. & W. at 855.  
95 Marrone v. Wash. Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633, 636 (1913). 
96 Id. at 636-37. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 636. 
100 Id. 
101 See Ralph W. Aigler, Revocability of Licenses – The Rule of Wood v. Leadbitter, MICH. L. 
REV. 401, 401 (1915) (citing Marrone to show that “[t]he rule of Wood v. Leadbitter has been almost 
uniformly followed by the American courts”); Charles E. Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law, 21 
COLUM. L. REV. 757, 770 (1921) (citing Marrone for the proposition that American courts have 
followed Wood’s lead in holding that “a ticket-holder might be ejected by the proprietor at will”). 
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immediately criticized the decision, focusing on the unjust outcomes that the 
rule plainly appeared to support. Moreover, courts shied away from the rule 
in its purest form by rarely applying it in favor of proprietors when the ticket 
holder did nothing wrong. Instead, courts often found ways to find in favor 
of innocent ticket holders despite the rule’s obvious slant in favor of 
proprietors. Finally, shortly after Marrone, English courts exhibited their 
displeasure with the revocable license rule by invalidating Wood. 
1.  Policy Arguments Raised Against the Revocable License Rule 
First, Marrone was criticized for basing its holding on the public’s common 
understanding of tickets. In 1942, Alfred Conard argued, 
Ticket cases are not to be confused with social entertainment, domestic 
employment and retail merchandising, where the licensees understand very 
well that they enter the land and remain upon it by the proprietor’s favor. In 
ticket cases the parties do intend, to the extent that they think about it at all, 
to create an interest which has all the characteristics of an easement except 
for its relatively brief duration.102 
In other words, the common understanding of admission tickets at the time 
actually weighed in favor of finding that tickets grant the holder something 
closer to an irrevocable right of entry.  
 Additionally, academic commentary criticized the Marrone rule for its 
potential to lead to unjust outcomes for ticket holders. For example, in 1915, 
Ralph W. Aigler noted, “It does strike one as unjust . . . that after one has 
purchased a ticket to attend a theatre and has taken his seat he should be 
subject to expulsion at any time for a bad reason or no reason at all and then 
be limited to an action merely for the breach of the contract . . . .”103 Likewise, 
the dissenting judge in Bouknight v. Lester explicitly rejected the revocable 
license rule, explaining his “conviction that it does not appeal or conform to 
my common sense, conscience, or conception of the law.”104 Many condemned 
the rule because it could be used to deprive an innocent ticket holder of the 
opportunity to experience the event that he purchased a ticket to view.105 
 
102 Alfred F. Conard, An Analysis of Licenses in Land, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 825 (1942). An 
easement is defined as an “interest in land owned by another person, consisting in the right to use 
or control the land, or an area above or below it, for a specific limited purpose (such as to cross it 
for access to a public road).” Easement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
103 Aigler, supra note 101, at 403. 
104 112 S.E. 274, 276 (S.C. 1921) (Cothran, J., dissenting). 
105 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 101, at 757 (“Causes arise, however, in which the application of 
the rule would violate principles of the plainest justice . . . .”); Alfred F. Conard, The Privilege of Forcibly 
Ejecting an Amusement Patron, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 809, 810 (1942) (criticizing the rule for the “shock 
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2. Courts’ Limited Applications of Marrone 
Most early twentieth century courts that purported to follow the revocable 
license rule still did not allow proprietors to take advantage of the rule’s 
seemingly broad scope. Instead, courts very rarely used the Marrone rule to 
permit a proprietor to eject or exclude a patron that paid for an admission ticket 
and behaved appropriately.106 Even Shubert v. Nixon Amusement Co.,107 a case that 
has been cited as an example of the revocable license rule being used to sanction 
the arbitrary expulsion of a law-abiding customer,108 is not as straightforward as 
it may first appear. In Shubert, the expelled patron, Lee Shubert, was a theater 
producer who decided to attend a show produced by his competitor—an 
individual with whom he had been engaged in a “trade war.”109 One aspect of 
these competitive relationships involved efforts by producers to spot 
attractive performers for other companies and make them better offers.110 
Thus, it is “doubtful” that Shubert truly believed he was a “welcome guest.”111 
Mr. Shubert, consequently, should not be described as an innocent patron 
who was arbitrarily excluded.112 
Likewise, cases in which courts applied the revocable license rule in favor 
of proprietors usually involved unruly patrons who deserved to be excluded. 
For example, the Marrone rule was used to eject patrons who were violating the 
proprietor’s rules regarding proper behavior.113 Indeed, even Wood and Marrone 
did not involve factual situations in which the excluded patrons were completely 
innocent. As Conard explains, the plaintiff in Wood was ejected “in consequence 
 
which it gives to many people’s sense of justice” and noting that “an amusement patron who is put out 
of his seat has been abused in the same sense that a citizen who is driven off the street has been abused”). 
106 See, e.g., Kelly v. Dent Theaters, Inc., 21 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (“We have 
examined practically all the cases [cited by the parties that apply the Marrone rule], and find that . . . [only 
one] of them involved the arbitrary and wholly unwarranted ejection of a ticket holding patron who had 
been duly received, accepted, and assigned a seat and was conducting himself in a proper and lawful 
manner . . . .”); Conard, supra note 105, at 812 (analyzing twenty-one cases that are cited in the 
American Lawyer’s Reports in support of the Marrone rule that tickets are revocable licenses and 
finding that none of the cases involved a factual situation in which a patron was arbitrarily ejected 
after purchasing a proper ticket and behaving properly). 
107 See 83 A. 369, 371 (N.J. 1912) (adopting the revocable license rule as the governing law in 
New Jersey and holding that a theater patron could be ejected without any reason, even after the 
patron paid for a ticket and took his seat). 
108 See Kelly, 21 S.W.2d at 593 (citing Shubert as the only example of a case that applied the rule 
in such a way). 
109 Conard, supra note 105, at 814. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Interestingly, the court’s opinion fails to mention Mr. Shubert’s occupation or the rivalry 
between the parties. 
113 Conard, supra note 105, at 813-14 (noting that four of the twenty-one cases cited for the 
revocable license rule involved patrons who were admittedly violating the establishment’s rules and 
that an additional three involved patrons who had broken rules in the past). 
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of some alleged malpractices of his on a former occasion, connected with the 
turf,” and Mr. Marrone was ejected “on the charge of having ‘doped’ or drugged 
a horse entered by him for a race a few days before.”114 In short, applications of 
the revocable license rule in favor of proprietors were confined to cases in which 
the patron deserved to be expelled. 
3. Courts’ Avoidance of Marrone’s Unjust Applications 
Furthermore, courts creatively skirted the revocable license rule when a 
plain application of it would have been unjust by using alternate grounds of 
recovery for plaintiffs. For example, in Planchard v. Klaw & Erlanger New 
Orleans Theater Co., the Supreme Court of Louisiana acknowledged the rule 
that tickets are revocable licenses but nevertheless awarded $500 in damages 
to an expelled patron for insult and maltreatment.115 Similarly, in Boswell v. 
Barnum & Bailey, the Supreme Court of Tennessee referred to a ticket as a 
“mere revocable license” but ultimately affirmed $500 jury verdicts in favor of 
expelled patrons because the ushers used “insulting and profane” language 
toward the patrons in the presence of a large crowd.116 And, in Saenger Theatres 
Corp. v. Herndon, the Supreme Court of Mississippi noted the proprietor’s right 
“to revoke the license to enter which is conferred by the purchase of a ticket of 
admission,” but it ultimately affirmed an award for the excluded patron based 
on “shame and humiliation.”117 The court explained, “Ordinarily, it is true, 
damages for mental pain and suffering not accompanied by a distinct physical 
injury are not allowable; but this rule does not include cases of wanton or 
shamefully gross wrong, such as the case now before us.”118 In all of these cases, 
the court could have simply cited Marrone to deny the plaintiffs any relief beyond 
the price of their tickets. Thus, courts’ reluctance to apply Marrone—and their 
use of alternate theories of recovery—underscores the low regard in which they 
held the revocable license rule. Indeed, Conard characterized these decisions as 
indicative of “a new tort of insult” that amounts to “a practical evasion of the 
rule that an amusement patron’s license is revocable.”119 
Finally, some courts avoided the rule by creatively interpreting the facts such 
that the rule would be inapplicable. For instance, in Metts v. Charleston Theater 
Co., the Supreme Court of South Carolina allowed a plaintiff to recover punitive 
damages after being excluded from a theater when the proprietor realized that 
 
114 Id. at 813 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Wood v. 
Leadbitter, (1845) 153 Eng. Rep. (Exch.) 351; 13 M. & W. 838; then quoting Marrone v. Wash. Jockey 
Club, 227 U.S. 633 (1913)). 
115 117 So. 132, 133-34 (La. 1928). 
116 185 S.W. 692, 692-93 (Tenn. 1916). 
117 178 So. 86, 87 (Miss. 1938). 
118 Id. 
119 Conard, supra note 105, at 811. 
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the plaintiff had accidentally been given a ticket to the previous performance.120 
The court acknowledged the revocable license rule but ultimately avoided its 
application by finding that the defendant never actually revoked the plaintiff ’s 
ticket, despite “abundant evidence to support the defendant’s contention that 
there was a revocation.”121 This led one commentator to argue that the court was 
convinced of the “justice of the plaintiff ’s cause of action,” and that the court 
“adopted this convenient solution” to “free itself from the firmly-embedded notion 
that a ‘license’ not coupled with a grant under seal is revocable at the will of the 
licensor.”122 Another described how courts, “apparently realizing the practical 
injustice worked by a true application of the rule of the Wood case, . . . conveniently 
evade its consequences” while “purporting to follow it.”123 
4. England’s Abandonment of the Revocable License Rule  
Due to Its Inequitable Implications 
Meanwhile across the pond, English courts viewed the Wood rule with even 
more disdain and ultimately decided to formally abandon the doctrine that 
tickets are revocable licenses. Wood was effectively nullified in 1915 by Hurst v. 
Picture Theatres, Ltd., an expelled theater patron case.124 In Hurst, the court 
explained that given the merger of law and equity, Wood was no longer good 
law and could not be “applied in its integrity in a Court which is bound to give 
effect to equitable considerations.”125 In addition, the court rejected Wood on 
policy grounds, explaining that to hold “it is competent to the proprietors of 
the theatre, merely because they choose so to do, to call upon [a behaving 
patron] to withdraw before he has seen the performance” is “contrary to good 
sense” and likely to bring about “startling results.”126 Thus, the court affirmed 
a judgment against the theater in tort, noting that the patron had purchased a 
right to remain in the theater for the duration of the show, as opposed to a 
revocable license.127 Shortly thereafter, English courts confirmed that Wood 
 
120 89 S.E. 389, 390 (S.C. 1916). 
121 S.F.D., supra note 91, at 396. 
122 Id. 
123 J.A.R., supra note 91, at 602. 
124 [1915] 1 KB 1 at 1. 
125 Id. at 9. 
126 Id. at 5. 
127 Id. at 11. The court explained that the theater committed a tort by removing the patron and 
that the removal constituted “an assault upon him in law.” Id. Consequently, the court affirmed a 
jury verdict granting a higher award than the price of the ticket. Id. It is important to note that the 
patron left peacefully after being asked to leave and that the theater did not have him forcibly 
removed. Id. at 11. Thus, the holding in favor of the patron was not based on the manner in which 
he was removed. Instead, the holding was based on the court’s characterization of an admission ticket 
as something more than a revocable license. In other words, Hurst went beyond merely finding a 
way to creatively avoid applying the revocable license rule. 
2017] Revoking the Revocable License Rule 457 
was no longer good law, relying on the merger of law and equity as evidence 
of Wood’s inapplicability.128 
C. Reconsidering the Revocable License Rule’s Intended Purpose and Scope 
All of these criticisms of and departures from the rule raise a question: 
what purpose, if any, did the revocable license rule originally serve? Conard 
suggested an answer: 
I conclude that the proprietor’s privilege of arbitrary expulsion serves a 
somewhat useful purpose, for the strange reason that practically no arbitrary 
expulsions occur. It protects a proprietor from liability to a patron whom he 
has expelled with a reasonable, or at least an honest, belief that he constituted 
a present threat to order in the theater, by giving the jury no chance to find 
erroneously that the manager was arbitrary.129 
In other words, the rule may have been adopted to ensure that honest 
proprietors were not subjected to liability for ejecting and excluding patrons 
who actually deserved to be excluded. This calls to mind Marrone’s warning 
that “there would be obvious inconveniences” if the ticket holder was held to 
possess a right in rem against the proprietor.130 Those “obvious inconveniences” 
may refer to opportunities for juries to find against proprietors who “act 
reasonably or in good faith” and the resulting impediment to the “proprietor’s 
duty to keep his premises safe for others.”131 Indeed, courts and commentators 
in the period immediately following Marrone firmly believed in a proprietor’s 
duty to maintain order in his venue.132 
Likewise, Marrone may have dismissed any concerns about the rule’s 
seemingly wide scope and potential for unjust applications on the assumption 
that proprietors generally did not exclude ticket-bearing patrons. Indeed, 
academics in the period immediately following Marrone believed that 
economic pressure would prevent proprietors from arbitrarily expelling 
 
128 Liebman, supra note 93, at 437; see also Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd. v. Millennium 
Prods. Ltd. [1948] AC 173 (HL) at 191 (“[S]ince the fusion of law and equity, . . . Wood[] . . . should no 
longer be regarded as an authority.”); Errington v. Errington [1952] 1 KB 290 at 298-299 (“Law and 
equity have been fused for nearly 80 years, and since 1948 it has been clear that, as a result of the fusion, 
a licensor will not be permitted to eject a licensee in breach of a contract to allow him to remain.”). 
129 Conard, supra note 105, at 822. 
130 See supra text accompanying note 100; see also Marrone v. Wash. Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633, 
636 (1913). 
131 Conard, supra note 105, at 823. 
132 See, e.g., Russo v. Orpheum Theatre & Realty Co., 66 So. 385, 386 (La. 1914) (explaining a 
theater superintendent’s duty to maintain order during a performance); Licenses—Revocation—Liability 
of Theatre Owner for Unwarranted Ejection of Patron, 42 HARV. L. REV. 834, 835 (1929) (“In the interest 
of maintaining order, a proprietor must be permitted to eject a patron if there is reasonable cause to 
believe that he has violated the implied conditions of his contract, and is creating a disturbance.”). 
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patrons.133 Similarly, lawyers of that era who represented theater proprietors 
called it “ridiculous” to suggest that “management would order or tolerate 
arbitrary expulsions,” suggesting that such expulsions would be bad for 
business.134 In one extreme example, Alexander Woollcott, a New York Times 
theater critic, described the aftermath of Woollcott v. Shubert, in which the court 
affirmed the dismissal of his lawsuit against a theater for excluding him:135  
Within ten minutes the Times had excluded all Shubert advertising from its 
columns and also all allusion to any actor playing in a Shubert theater . . . . [H]aving 
won the decision in the courts, the Shuberts were no better off than before. Their 
plays, their players and their advertising were ignored. Under this treatment they 
soon came begging for my return.136 
The Marrone Court may have assumed that ticket holders did not need 
the law to protect them from unethical proprietors. Proprietors who chose to 
behave in such a manner would face other consequences for their actions. 
Thus, the revocable license rule likely was not meant to supply proprietors 
with an unlimited power to exclude. Instead, the rule was designed to supply 
proprietors with a reliable legal basis for dealing with unruly patrons. The 
revocable license rule merely “masks judicial belief that theater proprietors 
can be trusted not to expel their patrons unjustifiably” and that “juries cannot 
be trusted to determine fairly whether an expulsion is justified.”137 In other 
words, the rule simply protected ethical proprietors from the possibility of a 
jury deciding factual questions in favor of unruly patrons. 
IV.  THE REVOCABLE LICENSE RULE’S CONTINUED VITALITY                  
IN THE MODERN SECONDARY TICKET MARKET 
Given the revocable license rule’s troubled background and limited scope, 
lawmakers must reconsider the extent to which it continues to inform our 
view of the ticket market today. Specifically, lawmakers should be concerned 
with the rule’s applicability in the modern online resale market for sporting 
tickets. In this Part, I explain how the current economic landscape for sports 
tickets actually incentivizes teams to exploit the revocable license rule to the 
detriment of ticket holders, making the rule a more dangerous weapon in the 
hands of teams today than it was for theater owners in the early twentieth 
 
133 See, e.g., Conard, supra note 105, at 820 (“[P]roprietors will act with decent caution, regardless 
of legal sanctions.”). 
134 Id. at 817. Conard concluded, “[T]he conception of a proprietor arbitrarily expelling a 
patron is a legal fiction. Proprietors very rarely expel patrons who are not violating established rules, 
or suspected of it, despite their legal privilege to do so.” Id. at 816. 
135 111 N.E. 829, 829 (N.Y. 1916). 
136 Conard, supra note 105, at 821 (quoting Letter from Alexander Woollcott, N.Y. Times (June 5, 1938)). 
137 Conard, supra note 102, at 823. 
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century. I then argue that policy and fairness considerations should spur lawmakers 
to question the rule’s continued relevance in the modern ticket resale context. 
Finally, I propose suggestions that lawmakers and the industry can implement to 
reach a fair solution for all sides. Most importantly, my goal is to ensure that 
lawmakers no longer allow teams to take advantage of an outdated rule that was 
designed in another context and for a different and limited purpose. 
A. The Modern Secondary Ticket Market and Teams’ Strong Incentives  
to Exploit the Revocable License Rule 
While economic incentives for early twentieth century proprietors aligned 
with the interests of patrons, the proliferation of the contemporary secondary 
ticket market has created lucrative opportunities for proprietors to take full 
advantage of the revocable license rule to the detriment of ticket holders. The 
economic context has changed, and proprietors, such as sports teams, can now 
generate more money by controlling the secondary market by using the Marrone 
rule to impose non-negotiable resale restrictions on ticket holders. 
The contemporary secondary market presents three principal concerns for 
teams. First, exchanges like StubHub compete with teams’ efforts to sell tickets 
directly to fans on a game-by-game basis. Second, the availability of discounted 
tickets on the secondary market can undercut teams’ efforts to sell season 
ticket subscriptions to fans. Finally, the current secondary market presents 
more opportunities for high-volume ticket scalping since there are now a 
myriad of platforms for ticket holders to sell tickets to fans for a profit. All of 
these concerns incentivize teams to use the revocable license rule to control the 
secondary market. Thus, unlike early twentieth century proprietors, modern 
teams have strong economic incentives to utilize the revocable license rule in 
ways that are detrimental to their customers’ interests. In short, taking full 
advantage of the revocable license rule is now good for business. 
First, team executives lament StubHub’s ability to cut into their business.138 
For example, on one particular night, for roughly two-thirds of MLB teams, 
69% of tickets sold through StubHub were bought for lower than face value 
prices.139 When fans buy tickets from the secondary market instead of from 
the team, the team loses a sale that it would otherwise ordinarily make.140 
Similarly, teams are concerned that the presence of discounted tickets on the 
secondary market undercuts the value of being a season ticket holder and that 
fans who buy directly from the team may stop doing so if they decide that it 
would be cheaper to wait to purchase tickets on sites like StubHub closer to 
 
138 See supra text accompanying notes 15–20. 
139 See King & Fisher, supra note 9. 
140 Of course, one counterargument to this point is that some ticket purchasers may only decide 
to purchase tickets because of the discount provided by the secondary market. 
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the day of the game. For instance, one Yankees executive defended the team’s 
decision to eliminate paper tickets by noting, 
The problem below market at a certain point is that if you buy a ticket in a 
very premium location and pay a substantial amount of money. It’s not that 
we don’t want that fan to sell it, but that fan is sitting there having paid a 
substantial amount of money for a ticket and [another] fan picks it up for a 
buck-and-a-half and sits there, and it’s frustrating to the purchaser of the full 
amount. And quite frankly, the fan may be someone who has never sat in a 
premium location. So that’s a frustration to our existing fan base.141 
While the last two sentences of the Yankees executive’s statement were criticized 
for being unnecessary and offensive,142 his earlier point is reasonable: fans who 
pay full price would not be happy to learn that other fans are consistently 
purchasing discounted tickets—for the same seat—on the secondary market. 
Additionally, the modern secondary market presents new opportunities 
for high-volume ticket scalping: individuals can now purchase large quantities 
of season tickets directly from a team with the sole intention of selling tickets 
to actual fans for a profit.143 A simple Craigslist search for New York Mets 
tickets reveals multiple postings in which sellers are offering tickets available 
for multiple Mets home games.144 StubHub even allows fans to sell an entire 
season ticket subscription in one transaction.145 Alternatively, scalpers can 
easily list their tickets online for every game individually and adjust prices 
according to the expected demand for each game. 
Understandably, teams are concerned with these practices. In their motion 
to dismiss the season ticket holder class action suit discussed above,146 the 
New Jersey Devils accused the plaintiffs of having intentions to scalp tickets: 
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“Plaintiffs have their own separate agenda and their interests do not align 
with fans who have bought season tickets. They are, at bottom, ticket brokers 
masking as ‘fans’ who are most interested in buying and reselling large numbers 
of tickets for their own benefit.”147 Thus, primary ticket vendors resent resellers 
who are able to earn profits from the resale of tickets without contributing to the 
event or assuming the risk that comes with planning and hosting the event.148 
Given these concerns, it is not surprising that teams are implementing new 
initiatives to curb the influence of the secondary market149 and that teams are 
relying on the revocable license rule to defend these measures.150 
B. The Need to Curb Teams’ Use of the Revocable License Rule  
in the Modern Resale Context 
Teams seeking to defend resale restrictions should not be able to make use of 
a doctrine that was likely designed for a very specific purpose—protecting 
proprietors’ right to exclude unruly patrons—and that rested on the now-outdated 
assumption that economic incentives would prevent proprietors from applying 
the rule to the detriment of their patrons. Policy and fairness considerations 
ultimately weigh in favor of limiting teams’ ability to impose restrictions on 
ticket holders’ resale rights. Though teams possess some legitimate concerns 
about the growth of the secondary market, they should not be granted free reign 
to impose resale restrictions as they see fit. Such freedom has resulted in very 
unfair outcomes for fans as teams have been able to push the risk of an 
unsuccessful season onto season ticket holders while maintaining the right to 
capture the additional financial benefit of a potential strong season. Moreover, 
current resale restrictions artificially inflate ticket prices on the secondary 
market, which makes it more difficult for less wealthy fans to attend games 
and more difficult for ticket holders to recoup some of their investment. 
Teams’ concerns about ordinary (non-high-volume scalper) ticket holders 
who earn profits through resales must be discounted. After all, issuers in the 
securities markets face the same situation when broker-dealers profit through 
resales of an issuer’s securities, yet this practice is acceptable. Happel and 
Jennings explain, “[W]e [do not] decide that investment firms that deal in 
secondary trading are making far too much money from the increase in value in 
the stocks and should be, therefore, cut out of the markets with their economic 
rents going back to the company.”151 In addition, while teams and primary ticket 
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vendors might lose money when already-sold tickets subsequently increase in 
value, the reverse is just as true—ticket holders suffer when the value of their 
already-purchased tickets decreases. This can be due to a variety of circumstances, 
including a team having an unsuccessful season or even bad weather on a particular 
evening. Put another way, teams often achieve financial gains in relation to their 
customers by selling tickets in advance and eliminating the risk of the ticket later 
declining in value. Teams should not be able to simultaneously hedge the other 
way by retaining the right to direct potential resale profits their way. This is 
exactly the kind of situation that prompted the Timberwolves season ticket holders 
to sue.152 In their complaint, the fans explained, “Because the Timberwolves have 
performed so poorly, Plaintiffs and class members have been left holding the bag, 
since reasonable market purchasers have no interest in paying premium prices 
for a team mired at the bottom of the conference standings with no hopes of 
making the NBA playoffs.”153 If we do not expect the Timberwolves to offer a 
refund to season ticket holders during a bad season, why should we allow them 
to capture all of the upside during a better season? 
Finally, resale restrictions are troubling in that they artificially inflate market 
prices so that fewer fans can afford tickets. A February 2016 report prepared by 
the Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York describes the 
state’s concern with “the setting of price floors on ticket resale, the practices 
that impede consumer access to alternative ticket resale platforms, and . . . the 
combined effect of such conduct on consumers.”154 The report specifically 
highlights the NFL Ticket Exchange and the now-defunct Yankees Ticket 
Exchange as examples of team-managed resale exchanges that incorporate price 
floors.155 These price floors in turn deprive the public of the “chief benefit of the 
market-driven approach[:] . . . lower prices.”156 Similarly, the report discusses 
other examples of measures teams use to restrict resales, including delayed 
ticket delivery mechanisms as well as cancelling the season subscriptions of 
fans who sell their tickets on sites like StubHub.157 
The New York Attorney General is rightfully troubled by these practices 
because the New York Legislature, in an attempt to benefit consumers, decided 
to eliminate resale restrictions in 2007.158 The rationale behind the decision was 
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that an increase in supply on the secondary market would lead to lower prices.159 
For example, proponents hoped that prices of late-season tickets to watch teams 
not destined for the playoffs would decline in an open secondary market, 
“allowing fans who otherwise might not be able to afford to see a [game] to buy 
tickets for far less money.”160 Price floors on team-mandated exchanges, however, 
eliminate this possibility, “expos[ing] the public to the full costs of the new ticket 
economy, while depriving the public of the benefits.”161 Constraints on ticket resales 
result in “monopoly power and higher ticket prices controlled by the promoter or 
owner,” an unfavorable outcome for fans.162 For example, Timberwolves fans who 
cannot afford season tickets are deprived of opportunities to see their team play at 
a reduced rate. Likewise, Timberwolves season ticket holders are being deprived 
of opportunities to recoup some of their costs since other fans will not pay to 
see the team at the price floor’s artificially inflated price. Similarly, an analysis of 
Yankees ticket prices listed on StubHub for a game prior to the effective date of 
the parties’ new resale agreement suggests that the deal’s 50% price floor will result 
in hundreds of tickets being listed for prices in excess of their true market value.163 
At the very least, given the revocable license rule’s original criticisms and very 
limited purpose, it is troubling that the sports industry now seems to blindly 
accept the rule’s force in the ticket resale space.164 From the early twentieth 
century to the present day, courts, scholars, and industry insiders have seen the 
revocable license rule gradually transform from a harshly criticized doctrine that 
was applied in very narrow circumstances to an uncontroversial principle that can 
be applied in all contexts. Therefore, regardless of whether we ultimately allow 
teams to impose restrictions on ticket resales, we should be troubled by the 
industry’s reliance on the revocable license rule. The continued prominence of 
the view that tickets are revocable licenses allows teams to “rely on common law 
property principles . . . to achieve a form of antiscalping regulation that has not 
been subjected to the rigors of the democratic process that previous and existing 
antiscalping laws endured to become law.”165 
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C. Going Forward 
In this Section, I provide two principal recommendations to protect fans from 
the harms of the revocable license rule. First, courts should refuse to blindly apply 
the rule in favor of teams and should—instead—follow the example set by the 
early twentieth century courts to limit the rule’s application to situations in which 
the balance of equities favor the proprietor. Second, lawmakers should devise a 
new comprehensive legislative scheme that accounts for the concerns of both 
teams and ticket holders. The scheme must allow for a relatively open secondary 
market that benefits both ticket holders and ticket seekers and that also protects 
teams from high-volume ticket scalpers who unfairly exploit primary seller’s 
below-market prices. The common thread uniting both of these proposals is my 
hope that lawmakers, courts, and sports lawyers will no longer assume that the 
law of tickets should continue to be governed by the outdated revocable license 
rule. Instead, lawmakers must begin to develop and implement practical solutions 
to these modern problems. 
1. Avoiding Rote Application of the Revocable License Rule 
Courts addressing the secondary ticket market should follow the example 
of early twentieth century courts and avoid applying the revocable license rule 
when doing so will lead to unjust outcomes.166 Some contemporary courts have 
done just that and should be looked to as modern examples. For instance, in 
Brotherson v. Professional Basketball Club, L.L.C., former Seattle Supersonics 
season ticket holders sued the team after their three-year season-ticket agreements 
were revoked when the franchise abruptly moved to Oklahoma City.167 
Noting that the agreement with fans was “conspicuously silent regarding the 
revocation of tickets,” the court ultimately rejected the team’s attempt to use 
the revocable license rule.168 Ultimately, the court chided the Supersonics for 
attempting to revoke the agreements “solely because it sold equivalent tickets 
at a higher price to Oklahoma [City] Thunder fans, and it desires to curry the 
favor of those fans rather than Sonics fans.”169 
 
166 See supra subsection III.B.3. 
167 604 F. Supp. 2d. 1276, 1282 (W.D. Wash. 2009). 
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As a result, the plaintiffs were not limited to a mere refund of the purchase 
price, and they could seek additional expectation damages.170 The court 
acknowledged that one such potential “expectation was that Plaintiffs would be 
able to sell tickets for games that they did not want to see” and that “[d]epending 
on factors . . . such as the team’s performance, star quality of the team’s players, 
or the quality of the opponent’s team or players, tickets might be more valuable 
than the price Plaintiffs paid.”171 Thus, the court recognized that the plaintiffs’ 
tickets entitled them to something beyond the mere revocable right to attend a 
series of games. The lawsuit ultimately settled in July 2010 when the team agreed 
to pay the plaintiffs $1.6 million.172 
Similarly, in Ibe v. NFL, the court rejected the NFL’s argument that its 
liability should be limited to the face value ticket price when the plaintiffs 
purchased Super Bowl tickets and spent thousands of dollars traveling to the 
host city only to be denied entrance to the game.173 While “recogniz[ing] that, 
generally, a ticket to an entertainment venue is a revocable license, terminable 
at the will of the proprietor,” the court found the revocable license rule “to be 
inapplicable here . . . to the extent the NFL relies on it to limit Plaintiffs’ 
recovery.”174 The court explained that since “this is a situation where fans 
foreseeably travel long distances and incur substantial expenses to attend a 
Super Bowl, a right to revoke the license should be denied on equitable 
grounds.”175 In sum, the court refused to blindly apply the revocable license rule 
in the league’s favor because doing so would have led to an unjust outcome for 
the plaintiffs. This case is factually analogous to that of the disgruntled fans suing 
the NFL for its cancellation of the annual summer Hall of Fame game,176 and the 
court presiding over that suit should look to Ibe as persuasive authority. 
Relatedly, Mayer v. Belichick, even when deciding in favor of the team, 
refused to blindly apply the revocable license rule without considering the 
fairness concerns on both sides of the issue. The court ultimately affirmed the 
dismissal of a fan’s “unusual” claim against the New England Patriots and the 
NFL for tortious interference with contractual relations, which stemmed from 
the visiting team’s allegedly improper taping of the home team’s sidelines 
during the game.177 However, the court’s reasoning did not rely on a blind 
application of Marrone; rather, the court observed that it need not decide the 
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full scope of a ticket holder’s rights because the fan received exactly what he 
paid for—namely, a seat to see the Jets play the Patriots.178 But the court did 
not stop there and instead went on to discuss the potential implications of 
siding with the fan.179 Specifically, the court worried that allowing such a suit 
would encourage disappointed fans to sue in response to routine occurrences 
like poor calls by referees, based on claims that they did not see the fair game 
for which they had paid.180 
When confronted with the revocable license rule, courts should follow 
these examples and consider the policy implications of their decisions instead 
of blindly applying the rule regardless of the consequences. This approach 
will prevent the rule from being carelessly extended to new contexts that are 
far removed from its original purpose, which was to protect proprietors 
seeking to exclude unruly patrons.181 Likewise, this approach will help ticket 
holders and fans by preventing teams from abusing a rule that was designed 
for different purposes in another context. 
2. Recommendations for Legislative Reform that Balances Unfair Resale 
Restrictions with Unfair Ticket Scalping Profits 
Nevertheless, a focus on policy-driven applications of the rule in litigation 
will not entirely solve the problem. In addition, legislative reform should tackle 
the growing trend of teams crafting policies and ticket holder agreements that 
classify tickets—especially season tickets—as revocable licenses.182 To that end, 
I propose various legislative measures that lawmakers should embrace to 
develop a fair solution to the issue that accounts for the concerns of both teams 
and ticket holders. Specifically, the legislation must provide for a more open 
resale market that nonetheless deters high-volume ticket scalpers. 
Clear contracts and policies that classify tickets as revocable licenses and 
use that classification to limit resale rights may constrain even courts that 
doubt the appropriateness of the revocable license approach. For instance, in 
the bankruptcy context, courts often resolve disputes over resale rights based 
on the actual contractual arrangements between the team and the fan.183 As 
more teams begin to use Marrone’s revocable license language directly in their 
own agreements with fans, courts will be forced to honor such terms, and the 
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rest of the industry will likely follow suit.184 Indeed, in Frager, the Southern 
District of Indiana noted that “a season ticket holder may be permitted to 
transfer any rights he may have [but] those rights are created by the 
contract.”185 Consequently, courts’ ability to creatively evade the revocable 
license rule for policy reasons will be limited to cases in which a team has not 
established a clear resale policy. 
Therefore, lawmakers should pass legislation that restricts the extent to 
which teams can impose resale restrictions on ticket holders. Such legislation, 
however, must account for fairness concerns on both sides and should not leave 
teams without any protections. Specifically, it must account for teams’ 
legitimate concerns about scalpers who exploit their industry knowledge and 
connections to acquire large quantities of high-demand tickets with the sole 
intention of selling them to generate a profit.186 
These concerns are not unfounded. For example, in December 2014, a single 
broker was able to purchase 1012 tickets in the first minute of the primary online 
public sale for a U2 concert at Madison Square Garden.187 Another broker used 
149 different American Express cards to bypass ticket-purchasing limits and 
made more than 38,000 purchases from 2013 to 2015.188 Similarly, as explained 
above, many season ticket holders are actually ticket brokers who simply sell all 
of their tickets in the hope of earning a profit.189 This is all very troubling to 
teams because brokers end up selling the tickets at substantial markups over 
face value. One study of six ticket brokers found that their average profit was 
49%.190 Brokers sometimes even resell tickets at prices over 1000% of the face 
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value.191 For example, $200 face value bleacher-seat tickets for Game 3 of the 
2016 World Series at Wrigley Field were on average listed for $3253 on the 
secondary market.192 It is unfair for these scalpers to easily profit from the labor 
and efforts of the teams and promoters that actually sponsor and run these 
high-demand events. This is especially concerning given that many teams and 
event promoters intentionally sell tickets to high-demand events at prices far 
below the level they anticipate the market will pay. Primary sellers do this to 
make tickets accessible to more fans and to generate goodwill.193 Scalpers 
thwart these efforts by “tak[ing] the benefits intended for the consumer.”194 
Consequently, many believe that “the average fan has no chance to buy tickets 
at face-value” to popular events.195 
Thus, a prohibition on all resale restrictions would be unfair to both teams 
and fans and would merely amount to an unjust windfall for ticket scalpers. 
Even early twentieth century courts upheld a proprietor’s right to protect patrons 
from the exorbitant markups that scalpers charged for popular events.196 
Therefore, lawmakers must devise a plan that accounts for these abuses while 
also facilitating a relatively open secondary market for fans seeking to buy 
tickets from real fans who simply cannot attend particular games. 
A Colorado statute addressing the secondary ticket market serves as a good 
starting point. In 2008, Colorado passed legislation that prohibited primary 
ticket sellers from conditioning the purchase of season tickets on the ticket 
holder’s consent to resale restrictions.197 Likewise, the law bans the use of 
sanctions to penalize ticket holders who resell tickets through unofficial resale 
exchanges.198 But, the statute is careful to point out that a proprietor may 
revoke the season tickets of patrons who violate the venue’s policies and pose a 
threat to the safety of other patrons.199 Such legislation represents a more 
equitable solution to the issue because it protects both fans and primary ticket 
vendors. The statute shields fans from the unjust effects of the revocable license 
rule while protecting proprietors’ rights to exclude unruly patrons, which was 
arguably the Marrone Court’s sole purpose in adopting the rule.200 But the 
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statute is not ideal because it fails to address teams’ legitimate concerns about 
high-volume ticket scalping. 
In the interest of devising a scheme that will protect the interests of both 
fans and ticket holders, I propose five specific recommendations. First, states 
should prohibit teams from implementing price floors on their official secondary 
ticket exchanges. Such measures do not deter ticket scalping abuses since price 
floors are only relevant when tickets are not in high demand. Instead, these 
policies prevent ticket holders from lowering their asking prices to the level 
that the market is willing to pay, which means that ticket holders often cannot 
recoup any of their investment. At the same time, fans who cannot afford face 
value prices are potentially deprived of their only chances to attend games. 
These problems are severely exacerbated when price floors are combined with 
team policies that prevent fans from using other exchanges that do not have 
price floors.201 In a promising development, the New York Attorney General 
recently announced a multistate settlement with the NFL—following an 
investigation into the league’s ticket resale policies—that bars the NFL from 
requiring that teams utilize price floors on their official resale websites.202  
Second, lawmakers should set and enforce strict caps on allowable 
markups for resale transactions. Resale caps would deter high-volume scalping 
by diminishing potential returns and, in doing so, ensure that more face value 
tickets make their way to actual fans. Similarly, resale caps would encourage teams 
to continue to sell tickets at lower than market value prices to generate goodwill. 
And, these caps will not prevent ticket holders from selling their tickets when 
they cannot attend games. Furthermore, while the caps could diminish the 
potential resale returns that a casual ticket holder might earn for selling 
tickets to high-demand games, ticket holders in this legislative scheme will 
still be better off based on the elimination of price floors on official resale 
exchanges. Moreover, any ticket holder who is primarily concerned with 
resale profits is the kind of scalper about whom teams have a right to be upset. 
Of course, the caps must not be so low as to eliminate any incentive for secondary 
exchange sites to operate. Instead, legislators must find an appropriate level that 
“would still allow brokers a role in the market but would also ensure that any 
price markups [are] reasonable.”203 
Third, and relatedly, lawmakers should provide that teams may establish 
per-customer season ticket holder seat limitations that prevent high-volume 
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scalpers from buying season tickets in bulk. By extension, teams should be 
able to revoke the season tickets of current ticket holders whose quantity of 
tickets evinces an intent to engage in high-volume scalping. For example, 
beginning with the 2016–2017 basketball and hockey seasons, Madison 
Square Garden has decided to limit New York Knicks and New York Rangers 
season ticket purchasers to eight season tickets per licensee.204 In response, 
three ticket resale firms sued, claiming that the policy violated the venue’s 
ongoing commitment to always renew their season tickets.205 Both this policy 
and the Colts’ refusal to renew the ninety-four season tickets of a 
Pennsylvania-based ticket broker206 were clearly geared toward preventing 
high-volume ticket scalping: a Pennsylvania resident is obviously not 
planning to use ninety-four tickets for personal use each Sunday. These 
policies should be encouraged because they will only affect those who buy 
season tickets for high-volume scalping purposes: season ticket holders who 
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The Supreme Court of New York sided with Madison Square Garden and denied the plaintiffs’ 
request for a temporary restraining order. Dareh Gregorian, Madison Square Garden Can Put a Cap 
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merely wish to resell some tickets will not be adversely affected.207 In fact, 
these kinds of policies are likely to inhere to the benefit of fans.208 
Fourth, lawmakers should prevent teams from implementing non-transferable 
paperless ticket entry policies in conjunction with requiring that all resales be 
conducted through the team’s official exchange. This is precisely what the 
Timberwolves have done.209 These tickets resemble airline tickets, “requiring 
the presentation of identification and the credit card used to buy the ticket at 
the entrance to the venue.”210 Currently, New York is the only state that has 
prohibited ticket vendors from using a paperless ticket method as the 
 
207 It is important to distinguish per-customer seat limitations from team policies that prevent 
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ticketmaster-vs-stubhub-fight/2263557 [https://perma.cc/E69N-9T9M]. 
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of their tickets during a particular season may not be. Factors like a temporary drop in income, 
sickness, or an especially busy schedule one year might force a fan to resell more tickets than he or she 
is accustomed to selling. No bright-line rule could ever account for such contingencies. 
Interestingly, Florida lawmakers considered a bill that would have prevented the Lightning from 
implementing this and similar policies. Id. According to Representative Jared Moskowitz, the bill’s sponsor, 
the inspiration behind the proposed legislation was that “[t]ickets are expensive” and that “people [who] 
want to sell a portion of their season tickets to recoup some of those costs . . . should be able to do 
so without restrictions from the team or fear of having their seats revoked.” Id. The bill ultimately died in 
the House of Representative’s Regulatory Affairs Committee. FL – HB1127, Resale of Tickets, TRACKBILL, 
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209 See supra text accompanying notes 32–34. In addition, while the San Francisco 49ers’ ticket 
delivery policies are not entirely analogous to those of the Timberwolves, any legislative action taken 
on this point should nonetheless account for and prohibit what they have done: refusing to issue 
copies of tickets until three days before the game, while requiring and ensuring that any resales prior 
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outside of the team’s official exchange, it makes doing so extremely difficult since sales can only 
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exclusive delivery option.211 The New York Attorney General has proposed to 
lift the ban on paperless tickets, arguing that “[a]llowing these types of tickets 
would . . . make it more difficult for brokers to continue hoarding tickets and 
demanding exorbitant markups from fans.”212 While true, the resale caps 
discussed above will already serve to curb scalping. Meanwhile, allowing 
teams to exclusively use paperless tickets ultimately harms ticket holders by 
severely restricting their ability to resell tickets. For example, the Timberwolves 
season ticket holders note that the team’s new paperless ticket policy makes 
it “impossible for ticket holders to list the tickets on a secondary marketplace or 
platform such as StubHub or Ticketmaster, or even to physically sell or transfer 
them in a hand-to-hand transaction.”213 The result is a diminished market for 
fans, which will ultimately lead to greater financial losses for ticket holders. 
Finally, teams should not be allowed to punish ticket holders who choose to 
resell their tickets on unofficial resale exchanges. The Warriors should not be 
able to prevent fans from using StubHub instead of the Warriors’ official 
Ticketmaster-managed exchange. Such practices impose severe harms on both 
season ticket holders and fans seeking to purchase tickets for sold out individual 
games. Sellers are forced to deal with a more limited pool of potential buyers 
because specific team-managed exchanges often generate less traffic than widely 
known national exchanges like StubHub.214 Likewise, buyers are restricted to 
using just one resale exchange instead of having the opportunity to compare 
prices, fees, and delivery options across multiple competing venues. With no 
other exchanges to compete with, team-mandated exchanges are then free to 
impose any conditions they choose, including higher transaction fees and 
decreased delivery options. In short, less competition will translate to less 
incentive for teams to make their resale exchanges fan-friendly. 
That said, teams should still feel free to develop their own resale 
exchanges and compete with other sites like StubHub. Teams may attempt to 
drive traffic to their own site by offering special rewards to season ticket 
holders who choose to resell on their exchange. This kind of competition will 
lead to more favorable results for ticket holders and ticket seekers. Indeed, 
according to Wes Brodsky, chief executive of Contender.com, another resale 
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on price gives consumers the best chance of getting a fair deal.”215 In short, 
these five measures represent a fair compromise for teams and ticket holders. 
They allow ticket holders and ticket seekers to benefit from a relatively 
unrestricted secondary market while addressing teams’ legitimate concerns 
with high-volume ticket scalping abuses. 
CONCLUSION 
My goal in this Comment has been to inspire lawmakers to reconsider the 
revocable license rule’s continued vitality in the ticket market. I have demonstrated 
that the rule was originally devised for a limited purpose in a context in which 
proprietors had little reason to exploit it. The rule was not meant to provide a 
proprietor with an unbeatable weapon to be used against patrons whenever it 
serves the proprietor’s interests. Unfortunately, criticism of the rule has faded, and 
it now enjoys wide acceptance across the industry. This is particularly troublesome 
in the current secondary ticket market, in which teams have strong financial 
incentives to utilize the rule to the fullest extent possible, often to the detriment 
of their own fans. The result is a secondary ticket market that artificially inflates 
prices to low-demand games, hurting both fans trying to sell tickets and fans 
seeking to buy tickets. 
Of course, teams’ concerns about the proliferation of the secondary market 
are not entirely unfounded. For example, teams have legitimate concerns 
about ticket scalpers who buy large quantities of face value tickets to popular 
events only to sell them for higher prices on the secondary market. However, 
abandoning the revocable license rule does not require the industry to 
eliminate all primary seller protections. Instead, lawmakers must devise 
pragmatic solutions that account for the legitimate concerns of both fans and 
teams. To that end, I have advanced five proposals that I believe will result in 
a more equitable solution for all. Nevertheless, the substantive content of my 
proposals is less important than my overall message, which is that we will 
only be able to find a workable solution to these difficult problems by first 
abandoning the revocable license rule. The rule was developed for a very 
limited purpose and is based on outdated assumptions. The ticket market 
should not continue to be guided by an early twentieth century rule that the 
modern market has substantially outgrown. 
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